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U.S. CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS;
INDICATION OF A ROLL-BACK OF CIVIL

LIBERTIES OR A SIGN OF OUR
JURISPRUDENTIAL EVOLUTION?
JOSEPH KUBLER

I.

EXTRAORDINARY TIMES

Exigent circumstances require our government to cross legal
boundaries beyond those that are unacceptable during normal
times. 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that
"[w]hen America is at war.., people have to get used to having
less freedom." 2 A tearful Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reinforced
this view, a day after visiting Ground Zero, by saying that "we're
likely to experience more restrictions on our personal freedom
than has ever been the case in our country." 3 However,
extraordinary times can not eradicate our civil liberties despite
their call for extraordinary measures. "Lawyers have a special
duty to work to maintain the rule of law in the face of terrorism,
Justice O'Connor said, adding in a quotation from Margaret
1 See Christopher Dunn & Donna Leiberman, Security v. Civil Liberties: Don't
Subvert Nation's Values, NYCLU DAILY NEWS, Nov. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.nyclu.org/wtc00.html (exhibiting how even the starkest advocates of civil
liberties recognize the need for extreme measures in light of security concerns after
September lth); see also Roberto Lovato, Big Liberty is Watching; A Century After
Orwell's Birth, Reality Overtakes His Classic, IN THESE TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 20
(commenting on the public's response to government utilizing huge amounts of public and
private data concerning U.S. citizens and foreigners in post 9/11 times); Rachel L. Swarns,
Threats and Responses: Security Concerns;Immigrants Feel the Pinch of Post-9/11 Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A14 (discussing government immigration laws which have
developed as a result of post 9/11 security measures).
2 Adam Cohen, Justice Rehnquist's Ominous History of Wartime Freedom, N.Y. TIMES
Sept. 22, 2002, § 4 at 12 (explaining how views in Justice Rehnquist's book "ALL THE
LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME," reflect on what is occurring today).
3 Linda Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York Visit,
O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5 (quoting Justice
O'Connor's speech to law school students concerning her anticipation of restrictions on
civil liberties in the U.S.).
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Thatcher, the former British prime minister: 'Where law ends,
tyranny begins'."4 Justice Scalia's assurance that he will not let
the "ratchet[ing] down" of our rights "go beyond the
constitutional minimum" 5 requires us to trust that we know what
that minimum is today. Preservation of civil liberty is the force
pulling against the tightening of control to enhance security.
These opposing forces will forever be acting on each other. It
would be naive, dangerous, and counterproductive to think our
government could ignore the larger interests of society when an
individual's civil liberties come in conflict with broader societal
interests. 6 It becomes a balancing test in which our nation
weighs civil liberties against security.
In the wake of September 1 1 th we stand in extraordinary times
that threaten to tip the scales and disturb that balance. 7 Our
definition of terrorism is completely revamped.
We have a
heightened sensitivity to the real threat that exists close to home.
Fear motivates us to concede liberties in the areas of privacy and
rationalize violations of civil liberties that would never have been
accepted. 8 Warfare and the law of war have evolved beyond
4 Id. (repeating Justice 0' Connor's brief remarks, which emphasized the need to
proceed with caution after September 1 th).
5 Associated Press, Justice Scalia Says War Warrants Rights' Recess, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 19, 2003, availableat http://www.sacbee.com/24hour/special-reports/terrorism
story/814411p5777643c. html (failing to mention how he will prevent our slipping below
constitutional minimums or where these minimums are, his reassurance is uncovincing).
6 See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Justices Permit Secret Hearings; Deportation Cases
Can be Closed for Now, Court Says, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2002, at 1N (quoting David Cole,
a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, that "There is no question that the
Supreme Court is going to sooner rather than later be faced with how we should balance
security and civil liberties in a post-Sept. 11 era"); see also Shannon Lohrmann, BMV to
Ease ID Rules at End of Month, J. & COURIER (Ind.), Sept. 17, 2002, at Al (discussing how
Indiana Civil Liberties Union filed lawsuit against Bureau of Motor Vehicles, arguing
counterterrorism security measures violate individual immigrants). See generally Deb
Price, Men Sue Airlines, Claim Arab Bias, DETROIT NEWS, June 5, 2002, at 01A
(commenting on difficulties airlines face in trying to balance security concerns with civil
liberties after September 11, 2001).
7 See Charles M. Madigan, Bush Boosts Police Powers; Legal Immigrants Could be
Subject to Long Detentions, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 2001, at iN (highlighting how Bush's
expansion of government's power to detain legal immigrants suspected of crime, as new
weapon in his war on terrorism, has been criticized as erosion of civil liberties); see also
Staff, Our View, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.), Jan. 1, 2002, at 7A (warning
"America must learn to balance security against civil liberties"). See generally Nikki
Swartz, Information at a Price: Liberty vs. Security: Follow-Up Legislation Proposes to
Increase the Sweeping Domestic Intelligence and Surveillance Powers Granted to the U.S.
Federal Government, by the USA PatriotAct - But Will it be at the Cost of Civil Liberties?
Capital Edge: Legislative and Regulatory Update, 37 INFO. MGMT. J. 14 (May 1, 2003)
(exhibiting the debate over the proper balance between civil liberties and security).
8 Compare Iver Peterson, State Hearings On Profiling Are Extended, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2001, at B5 (discussing the extension of profiling trials and anti-profiling
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declared wars and traditional combat. 9 However, war with a
multinational fluid enemy, such as Al Qaeda, has not been
previously contemplated and raises questions about the
application of traditional law of war to this conflict. 10
Our government's attempts to weigh civil liberties against
security interests have almost invariably resulted in an
overstepping of what would be considered constitutional.l" The
Court's inability to resist using necessity to justify the
unconstitutional, particularly in wartime, is best illustrated by
Korematsu v. United States,12 where the Court held the detention
of Japanese citizens was constitutional.13 American citizens of
measures taken in New Jersey), with Sam M. Simon, Study: Harvard Students Support
Airport
Profiling,
HARV.
CRIMSON,
Mar.
19,
2003,
available
at
http://www.thecrimson.harvard.edu/article.aspx?ref=347128 (reporting "A large majority
of Harvard University Law students would support racial profiling if such screening
reduced air travel delays"). But see Philip Shenon, Airline Gave Defense Firm Passenger
Files, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at Al (showing many liberties groups are warning
privacy rights are becoming victims of government's struggle against terrorism).
9 See Ruth Wedgewood, Agora: Military Commissions; Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and
Military Commissions, 96 A.J.I.L. 328, 335 (2002) (presenting the view that this
expansion is required by the Geneva Conventions' recognition that war need not be
formally declared, along with the trend to not declare war in armed conflicts); see also
Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, A Presidency Defined in One Speech; Bush Saw Address as
Both Reassurance and Resolve to a Troubled Nation, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2002, at A01
(discussing Bush's speech concerning his declaration of war on terrorism). See generally
CNN Live Today: Legal Implications of Bush Declaring Combat Phase Over (CNN
television broadcast, May 1, 2003) (referring to declarations of war these days as "passe').
10 See Joan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Military Commissions: Jurisdiction of Military
Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 A.J.I.L. 345, 346 (pondering
various interpretations of what war means in the context of a war on terrorism); see also
Kenneth Anderson, The Military Tribunal Order: What to Do With Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda Terrorists?:A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy
on Detainees at GuantanamoBay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy 591, 621 (2002)
(discussing primary focus of debate and controversy over applications of war in war on
terrorism). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Responding to Rogue Regimes; From
Smart Bombs to Smart Sanctions; Luncheon Address Rogue Regimes and the
Individualizationof InternationalLaw, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 820 (2002) (stating it is
"much harder to put the 'war on terrorism' into the framework of traditional war").
11 See Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to
Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A04
(discussing the anti-terrorism legislation changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which enables the FBI to carry out wiretaps and searches that would otherwise be
unconstitutional); see also Siobhan Gorman, Power to the Government, 34 NAT'L J. 30
(2002) (arguing "It's not clear that the civil-liberties buck stops anywhere right now."). See
generally Peter Grier, Fragile Freedom, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2001, at 1
(exhibiting that overstepping might occur because "the proper balance between civil
liberties and security in wartime can be fiendishly hard to strike").
12 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13 See Id. at 223-24 (characterizing the detention as an "exclusion order" and not as
an imprisonment in a concentration camp because of "all the ugly connotations that term
implies"). But see Owen J. Roberts, Lecture: PhiladelphiaLawyer: A Cautionary Tale, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 495, 517 (1997) (stating to hold detention of Japanese citizens as
constitutional was to violate assurance of liberty and equality); Richard L. Strout,
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Japanese ancestry, who committed no crime, were taken from
their homes and detained in camps for fear that there were
disloyal members among them.14 In reviewing this action, the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny, but found that the
security threat provided a compelling interest that made the
ethnic round up constitutional.15 "There is a limit to what courts
will do to help those deprived of rights.., because judges have a
natural 'reluctance' to rule 'against the government on an issue of
national security during wartime."' 16 Deference to the executive
and other branches,17 the doctrine of political questions, and
expansion of war powers are the tools used in such
justifications. S There are, however, limits and Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer19 stands for the proposition that deference
is not limitless in times of war. 2 0

Japanese-AmericanInternment - 'A Grave Injustice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 25,
1983, at 5 (discussing how detention of such civilians of Japanese descent was viewed as
injustice).
14 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19 (giving great deference to the military, which is
"charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores" and who "concluded
that curfew provided inadequate protection"); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (exhibiting another case with required relocation areas for civilians of
Japanese ancestry); Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States,
49 A.F. L. REV. 67, 103-04 (2000) (discussing how actions were taken by U.S. to relocate
civilians of Japanese ancestry during WWI1).
15 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (referring to the real military dangers that were
present due to the war with the Japanese empire).
16 Cohen, supra note 2 (expressing concern over Justice Rehnquist's "selective
blindness").
17 See id. (recognizing that this deference is often so pervasive as to give credence to
justify phrase "inter arma silent legis' in time of war law is silent"); see also Safeguard
Civil Liberties, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 22, 2002, at 20A (stating 'With the court's reluctant to
second-guess the administration, the responsibility falls on Congress to make sure
fundamental liberties don't become casualties in this latest war."). See generally Detention
of U.S. Citizens Captured with the Taliban (National Public Radio broadcast Morning
Edition, Oct. 29, 2002, 10:00 AM ET) (conceding that courts are bound to give deference to
the executive branch in issues involving the waging of war).
18 See Cohen, supra note 2 (indicating that the political question doctrine has often
served to justify the expansion of executive power); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
25 (1942) (maintaining that the expansion of war powers has extended executive powers);
Robert Higgs, In the Name of Emergency, REASON, July 1987, available at
http://www.independent.org/ tiilnews/011017Higgs.html (Oct. 17, 2001) (positing that the
political question doctrine as well as the expansion of war powers have increased
executive powers).
19 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20 See Id. at 587 (insisting that the Constitution limits the functions of the executive
branch in the lawmaking process during wartime); Davies, supra note 14, at 79 (arguing
that there are limits on executive authority in wartime); see also Symposium, The
Constitutional Structure of National Government in the United States: Is it in a State of
Crisis?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 19 (1994) (detailing the procedural limits imposed on executive
authority during wartime).
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We expect some constitutional protections to erode in the face
of danger. 2 1 Indeed, using the classic economics of law approach,
Judge Richard A. Posner argues that "[civil liberties] should be
curtailed to the extent that the benefit of greater security
outweighs the cost in reduced liberty." 22 "[I]n wartime one can
expect 'protections will be ratcheted down to the constitutional
minimum,"' said Justice Scalia. 23 Certainly the public sentiment
is not overwhelmingly against many of these restrictions, as a
survey of Harvard law students shows overwhelming support of
racial profiling at airports. 24 Judge Posner correctly points out
that our government's exaggerated responses in the past were
considered reasonable at the time; only after a period of calm
reflection could what was excessive be separated from what was
necessary. 25 However, after the period of calm and with the
benefit of hindsight we have separated out what was proper and
exaggerated and then put up procedural safeguards to protect
against repeating our indiscretions. 2 6 The real question should
be, do these safeguards hold up when we are faced with the next
21 See Greenhouse, supra note 3, at B5 (predicting the imposition of restrictions on
civil liberties); see also Davies, supra note 14, at 73 (foreseeing possible limitations on civil
liberties during wartime). See generally The Constitutional Structure of National
Government in the United States: Is it in a State of Crisis?,supra note 20, at 20 (detailing
the potential incursions on civil liberties during wartime).
22 Posner analyzes the magnitude of the threats faced in World War II and the Civil
War without the benefit of hindsight so that we can truly evaluate the merits of limiting
liberty in those instances. See Richard A. Posner, Security versus Civil Liberties, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 2001, available at http://www.theatlantic.comissues/2001/12/posner.htm.
23 Justice Scalia Says War Warrants Rights' Recess, supra note 5, (speaking at
Carroll University Justice Scalia expressed the view that in wartime individual rights
would be scaled back to the constitutional minimum).
24 See Simon, supra note 8 (reporting that "a large majority of Harvard law students
would support racial profiling if such screening reduced air travel delays"); see also Charu
A. Chandrasekhar, Note, Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/11
Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 ASIAN L.J. 215, 216 (2003) (indicating that
racial profiling at airports is widespread). See generally Ellen Baker, Comment, Flying
While Arab-Racial Profiling and Air Travel Security, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1375, 1391
(2002) (indicating that public opinion supports the use of racial profiling at airports).
25 See Posner, supra note 22 (expressing the view that simple cost benefit analysis
justifies reduction in civil liberties so long as we trust the government to responsibly
perform the cost benefit analysis); see also Chandrasekhar, supra note 24, at 251-52
(maintaining that there is no justification for racial profiling). See generally Baker, supra
note 24, at 1391 (questioning whether it is necessary to use racial profiling at airports).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2003) (providing limitations on the detention of persons);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
and the Detention of U.S. Citizens, 112 YALE L.J. 961, 962 (2003) (detailing the procedural
safeguards provided by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)); see also Robert D. Evans, American Bar
Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendation on
Military Commissions, 2002 ARMY LAW. 8, 10 (2002) (commenting on various institutional
safeguards ameliorating possible incursions on civil liberties during wartime).
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threat? Under what force will the levee break? Will we revert
back to McCarthyism or detention followed by a period of apology
or are we witnessing the slow judicial and political evolution of
constitutional protections and civil liberties our forefathers
contemplated?
This author believes our government's use of enemy combatant
status to detain American citizens has violated our Constitution
and rolled back civil liberties beyond what is acceptable.
However, our jurisprudential evolution has been brought to bear
on the dynamic pull between security and civil liberty. To
examine this, I will look at enemy combatant status as applied to
American citizens, analyzing our legal authority to invoke such
status. This paper analyzes the justifications put forth by the
government for the use of enemy combatant status and explores
whether this is the type of reduction in civil liberty Judge Posner
advocated or whether we have slipped below even Justice Scalia's
constitutional minimum.
Finally, I will propose that
encroachments on civil liberties are reduced both in scale and
scope with every subsequent transgression and that this
evolution has a positive value despite the reality that there will
always be victims in our social experiment.
II. Two AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT ARE
BEING DETAINED AS ENEMY COMBATANTS

The first American born citizen to be declared an enemy
combatant was Yaser Esam Hamdi. 27 Hamdi was born in
Louisiana and moved to Saudi Arabia when he was young. 28
27 See Linda D. Kozaryn, Hunt Continues for Holdout Al Qaeda, Taliban; Hamdi
moved to Norfolk, AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICES, U.S. Department of
Defense (April 2002) (memorializing Hamdi's capture and detainment), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/n04O9
2002_200204091.html; see also Nat Hentoff, Who made George W. Bush Our King?,
VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Aug. 5, 2003, at 35 (calling the situation a "unprecedently serious
assault"); Michael Powell, No Choice But Guilty; Lackawanna Case Highlights Legal Tilt,
WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A01 (quoting Neal R. Sonnett, chairman of the American
Bar Association's Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, that "No previous
president has asserted the right to designate American-born defendants as enemy
combatants, [and] President Bush has named two, Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi").
28 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003) (maintaining that Hamdi
was "born in Louisiana [and] [he] left for Saudi Arabia when he was a small child"); Tim
McGlone, Hamdi Case May Go Before Supreme Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 2, 2003, at
B3 (highlighting that Hamdi's birth was in Louisiana because his Saudi Arabian parents
were working there at the time). See generally Bryan Bender, US Army ChaplainHeld In
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According to the military, Hamdi arrived in Afghanistan in July
or August of 2001, received weapons training, and joined with a
Taliban military unit. 2 9 Northern Alliance forces captured Hamdi
with a unit of the Taliban in late 2001.30 Though the opinion of
the Fourth Circuit intimates that Hamdi's Taliban unit was
engaged in battle with the Northern Alliance before his capture 3 1
the ACLU's Amicus Brief indicates that the government only
alleged that Hamdi was willing to fight "if necessary"32 and was
carrying an AK 47 when captured. 3 3 The Northern Alliance
transferred custody of Hamdi to the U.S. in Fall 2001.34 The
United States detained Hamdi in Afghanistan,35 transferred him
Spy Probe Muslim Based In Guantanamo, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2003, at Al
(classifying Hamdi as an American-born Saudi).
29 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (indicating that "[t]he military determined that Hamdi
'traveled to Afghanistan in approximately July or August of 2001' and proceeded to
,affiliate with a Taliban military unit and receive weapons training"'); Bender, supra note
28 (alleging that Hamdi fought with the Taliban); see also Tom Jackman, Judges Wary of
Interference in Hamdi Case; U.S. Appeals Panel Uneasy About JudicialReview of Military
Wartime Decisions,WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at A16 (relying on the Mobbs declaration).
30 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 2, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338) [hereinafter ACLU Brief 1] (stating
"[t]he northern alliance captured Hamdi in Afghanistan in late 2001"); see also Jerry
Markon, High Court Urged to Review Hamdi Detention, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2003, at B03
(naming November as the month of capture); Tim McGlone, Hamdi Case Appears To Be
Headed ForHigh Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 10, 2003, at Bi (repeating the government
assertion that Hamdi was holding a "Soviet-made military assault rifle" at the time of his
capture).
31 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (stating that "[w]hile serving with the Taliban in the
wake of September 11, he [Hamdi] was captured when his Taliban unit surrendered to
Northern Alliance forces with which it had been engaged in battle"); McGlone, supra note
30 (explaining that the government claimed Hamdi's capture happened during a battle
between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban); see also Markon, supra note 30 (stating
that 'While fighting with the Taliban troops in Afghanistan, Hamdi was captured by
Northern Alliance forces").
32 See ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 2 (alleging further that the government
maintained that Hamdi was "associated" with the Taliban).
33 The ACLU'S Brief notes that "at the time of his capture he was carrying a firearm."
Id. According to the court, "[h]e was in possession of an AK-47 rifle at the time of
surrender." Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460; McGlone, supra note 30.
34 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460 (detailing Hamdi's detention); Eric M. Freedman,
Yaser Hamdi and the Great Writ's Story, RECORDER (San Francisco), Feb. 7, 2003, at 5
(basing his information of the declaration by Michael Mobbs, a special advisor to the
undersecretary of defense); see also Bruce Fein, Judicial Squinting During War, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at A15 (claiming Hamdi was shuffled among Northern Alliance
prisons).
35 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460-61 (describing sequence of detentions in Afghanistan
which included the prison at Mazar-e-Sharif, the prison in Sheberghan and camp X-ray);
Tim McGlone, Norfolk Brig Detainee Put Taliban First, U.S. Claims; He Surrendered
During Battle With N. Alliance, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 26, 2002, at Al (giving Hamdi's
statement, which was made to a U.S. military interrogation team at a prison in
Sheberghan, Afghanistan, that "he went to Afghanistan to train with and, if necessary,
fight for the Taliban"); see also Stewart M. Powell, Detainee's Rights Allegedly Violated;
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to Guantanamo Bay, and eventually to the naval brig in Norfolk,
Virginia. 36 At the time, the spokeswoman for the Pentagon
explained the move to Norfolk was deemed appropriate after
discovering Hamdi might be a U.S. citizen. 37 The spokesperson
acknowledged the fact that U.S. citizenship would preclude the
possibility of trial by military tribunal and confessed a lack of
knowledge about what would be done with Hamdi.38
The second American citizen deemed an enemy combatant is
thirty-one year old Jose Padilla. 39 Padilla was born in Brooklyn
and moved to Chicago when he was five. 40 Chicago police
arrested him in 1985 "in connection with an armed robbery
turned homicide."41 After three years in juvenile detention, police
arrested Padilla twice for assault and battery and trespassing. 42
Arabian Student Born in U.S., SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 5, 2002, at 13A
(stating "Hamdi was taken into U.S. custody in Afghanistan").
36 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (continuing the description of Hamdi's detention);
McGlone, supra note 28 (explaining that Hamdi was eventually transferred from the brig
in Norfolk, Virginia to another brig in South Carolina); see also Alan Cooper, Court
Refuses Review In Taliban' Case, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, July 10, 2003, at A9
(noting that the transfer to the Norfolk brig was in April 2002).
37 See Kozaryn, supra note 27 (noting "that Yaser Esam Hamdi was moved to Naval
Station Norfolk, Va., from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Defense officials said Hamdi's move
was deemed appropriate in light of the possibility he is a U.S. citizen."); see also Hamdi,
316 F.3d at 460 (reasoning that the transfer of Hamdi to Norfolk was appropriate since he
may not have renounced his United States citizenship).
38 The statement was:
He is at the brig, getting good treatment, Clarke... As a captured enemy combatant,
he remains under the control of the Department of Defense. If he does indeed have
U.S. citizenship, then he would not be a candidate for the military commissions.
Beyond that, I just can't speculate about what we might do.
Kozaryn, supra note 27.
39 See Karen Branch-Brioso, Man Held As "Enemy Combatant" Has Right To
Attorney, Judge Rules; Ruling Also Supports Government's Authority to Detain Such
Suspects, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 2002, at A12 (noting that besides Padilla,
Hamdi is the only other "enemy combatant" held in the United States); see also
Edmonson, supra note 37, at 1A (referring to Padilla as an "enemy combatant"); Toni
Locy, Judge Says 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect Can Consult Lawyers, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2002,
at 2A (stating that President Bush has designated Padilla as an "enemy combatant").
40 See Patricia Hurtado, Speaking Up for Suspect; 'Dirty Bomb' Detainee's Lawyers
Want to See Client, Document, NEWSDAY (N. Y.), Oct. 30, 2002, at A24 (stating that
Padilla was born in Brooklyn and later moved to Chicago); Lynn Sweet, Agents Nabbed
Bomb Plot Suspect at O'Hare, CHIC. SuN-TIMES, June 11, 2002, at 6 (detailing Padilla's
criminal history); Jodi Wilgoren & Jo Thomas, Traces of Terror: The Bomb Suspect from
Chicago Gang to Possible Al Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19 (outlining
Padilla's criminal past from when he was a teenager arrested in connection with a
murder).
41 Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 40 (noting that Padilla spent time in juvenile
detention and prison).
42 See Lucio Guerrero et. al., A Couple of Years Back, I Knew he Entered a Cult,'
CHIC. SUN-TIMES, June 11, 2002, at 6 (detailing the circumstances of Padilla's assault and
battery charges); see also Jose Padilla's Past, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, June 12, 2002, at 6
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He faced weapons charges for possession of an unregistered .357
magnum and eventually skipped bail. 4 3 Florida police soon
apprehended him for shooting at another vehicle and he was
sentenced to jail.44 The former 'Latin Disciple' Chicago gang
member, 4 5 Jose Padilla, married a Muslim and adopted the name
Abdullah Al Muhajir after his Florida prison term in the early
1990's.46 In 1994, he lived in Brentwood, New York and does not
appear to have continued any criminal activity. 4 7 Later he moved
to Egypt. 48 The FBI arrested him on a material witness
warrant 4 9 on May 8, 2002 entering the United States in O'Hare
(chronicling Padilla's criminal life). See generally Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 40
(explaining Padilla's various arrests).
43 See Guerrero, supra note 42 (articulating Padilla's 1991 arrest); Wilgoren &
Thomas, supra note 40 (referring to Padilla's arrest in Chicago's West Side for possession
of a .375 Magnum Smith and Wesson); see also Amanda Ripley, The Case of the Dirty
Bomber: How a Chicago Street Gangster Allegedly Became a Soldier for Osama Bin
Laden, TIME MAG., June 24, 2002, at 28 (listing rap sheet of Padilla's adult crimes).
44 See Guerrero, supra note 42 (giving an account of Florida incident where Padilla
fired his gun at another vehicle); Ripley, supra note 43 (describing Padilla's road rage
incident); Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 40 (noting that Padilla was sentenced to 364
days in jail for firing his revolver at another car).
45 See Arian Campo-Flores & Dirk Johnson, From Taco Bell to Al Qaeda, NEWSWEEK,
June 24, 2002, at 34 (referring to Padilla as a "Latin Disciples gangbanger"); Wilgoren &
Thomas, supra note 40 (explaining that he identified himself with Latin Disciples gang);
see also Sweet, supra note 40, at 6 (identifying Padilla as a "former Chicago gang
member").
46 Although Jose Padilla adopted the name Abdullah Al Muhajir after his prison term
in the early 1990's, I will refer to him as Jose Padilla in order to be consistent with the
briefs and court papers. See Transcript of the Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding
the transfer of Abdulla Al Muhajir (Born Jose Padilla)to the Department of Defense, (June
10, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2002/061002agtranscripts.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Transcript]. He married a Muslim
woman and adopted his Islamic name sometime after being released in 1992. See
Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 40. Padilla officially converted to Islam in 1994. See
Ripley, supra note 43.
47 See Wilgoren & Thomas, supra note 40 (relaying a neighbor's memory of him
playing on the lawn with his son and expressing the shock of his Long Island and Chicago
neighbors). See generally Guerrero, supra note 42 (quoting a former neighbor saying "I've
got nothing bad to say about him."); Ripley, supra note 43 (reporting that a school
guidance counselor remembered Padilla as a force and not a bully).
48 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "After
his release from prison on that charge, Padilla moved to Egypt, took the name Abdullah al
Muhajir."); Campo-Flores & Johnson, supra note 45 (recounting that Padilla went to
Egypt to pursue religious studies); Marc Parry, For Lawyer, Case is About Due Process in
Peril, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Mar. 7, 2003, at 10 (claiming that Padilla's trips to Egypt and
Pakistan were one of three reasons that merited his detention).
49 See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69 (stating that on May 8, 2002, Padilla was
arrested on a material witness warrant); Branch-Brioso, supra note 39 (recounting
Padilla's arrest in May); see also Robert S. Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Congressional Statement F.B.I.; Joint Intelligence Inquiry (Oct. 17, 2002)
(quoting the Director of F.B.I. as saying "In May, the FBI served a material witness
warrant on a US citizen... Jose Padilla, as he entered the United States from Pakistan
at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport"), at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/mu
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International Airport after returning from Pakistan.50 The
United States tracked Mr. Padilla5l as he traveled to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 5 2 allegedly meeting with high-level Al
Queda Officials.53 He is alleged to have received training in
explosive devices and radiological dispersion devices 54 in order to
carry out a plot 55 to explode a "Dirty Bomb"56 in the US.57
ellerl0l702.htm [hereinafter Mueller Statement].
50 See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46 (explaining he was apprehended on May 8,
2002 after arriving at Chicago O'Hare International Airport from Pakistan); see also
Mueller Statement, supra note 49 (explaining the FBI made arrest of Padilla on a material
witness warrant). See generally Branch-Brioso, supra note 39 (detailing the circumstances
of Padilla's May 8 arrest).
51 Without detailing the scope of each agencies responsibility, Ashcroft "commend[ed]
the FBI the CIA, the Defense Department, and other federal agencies" for the
investigation that resulted in the arrest of Jose Padilla. See Ashcroft Transcript, supra
note 46. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency worked
together in the arrest and detention of Jose Padilla. See Sage, New Fear; Our Position:
The 'Dirty-Bomb' Arrest is Encouraging, But Rights Can't Be Ignored, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 12, 2002, at A14. The Central Intelligence Agency placed Padilla under
twenty-four hour a day surveillance after learning of his possible bomb plan for the
United States. See generally Toby Harnden & Anton LaGuardia, We Have the Bad Guy
Where He Needs to Be, DeclaresBush, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 12, 2002, at 15.
52 Excerpts of the Mobbs Declaration allege that Padilla did research on a dirty bomb
in an Al Qaeda safe house in Lahore, Pakistan and had meetings in Karachi regarding
terrorist plots in the U.S. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 573. Ashcroft explained he
traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan after being released from prison but did not specify
dates or times. See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46. While overseas, Padilla allegedly
met with Al Qaeda and discussed detonating a "dirty bomb." See Locy, supra note 39.
53 See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (claiming Padilla met with Usama Bin Laden
and Lieutenant Abu Zubaydeh in Afghanistan to propose the dirty bomb plot); see also
Eric Lichtblau, Bin Laden Chose 9/11 Targets Al Qaeda Leader Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 2003, at A22 (indicating Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a recently captured senior Al
Qaeda official, met with Jose Padilla and discussed Texas as a target). See generally
David Johnson, Major Catch, Critical Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at 1 (suggesting
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed led effort to get Padilla started on the dirty bomb plot).
54 See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46 (outlining training in explosive devices and
radiological dispersion devices); see also James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It
Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11, 2002, at 1 (citing
intelligence officials' statement that Padilla traveled to Pakistan and received training
from Al Qaeda in the wiring of explosives). See generally Paula Span, Enemy Combatant
Vanishes Into a 'Legal Black Hole" WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, at A01 (quoting Defense
Department Advisor Michael Mobbs' contention in a six page declaration that Padilla had
trained in wiring explosives).
55 To be more exact the dirty bomb was in its early planning stages. No definite plot
existed, rather Padilla is said to have been "exploring a plan to build and explode a dirty
bomb." See Ashcroft Transcript, supra note 46. In fact "Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz said, 'I don't think there was a plot beyond some fairly loose talk."' Press
Briefing by Ari Fleischer, James S. Brady Briefing Room (June 12, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020612-5.html#3
[hereinafter
"Fleischer Briefing T"]. FBI director Mueller referred to Padilla's capture only as "an
example of prevention." Eric Lichtblau, et al., U.S. Citizen Accused of Planningan Attack
Using a 'Dirty'Bomb,L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al.
56 "[A] radioactive "dirty bomb" involves exploding a conventional bomb that not only
kills victims in the immediate vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is
highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death and injury." Ashcroft Transcript,supra
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However, other law enforcement officials questioned his
involvement with Al Qaeda58 and his ability to carry out the dirty
bomb plot. 5 9 Ashcroft asserted that Jose Padilla was an Al Qaeda
operative, stating: "Let me be clear: We know from multiple
independent and corroborating sources that [Jose Padilla] was
closely associated with Al Qaeda and that as an Al Qaeda
operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on
innocent American civilians in the United States."60
note 46. The idea of a dirty bomb is "to kill and terrorize with radiation alone, by packing
radioactive material around an ordinary explosive and detonating it above a city."
William J. Broad et al., The Threats:Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at Al. The radioactive material spreads like dust falling all over
a city, perhaps killing hundreds and requiring a billion-dollar cleanup. Id. 'Without a
cleanup, the material would cling to surfaces and contaminate the area for decades." Id.
Although dirty bombs are far less lethal than nuclear weapons, they are "attractive to
terrorists because they can inflict widespread disruption for relatively little cost. With
conventional explosives and a few ounces of cesium 137 or strontium 90, a dirty bomb
could contaminate large swaths of real estate with dangerous radiation, unleashing panic
and rendering some areas uninhabitable for decades." Joby Warrick, Hunting a Deadly
Soviet Legacy; Concerns About 'Dirty Bomb' Drive Efforts to Find Radioactive Cesium,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at A01.
57 See Ashcroft Transcript, supra note 46 (proclaiming Padilla's citizenship and ability
to move inconspicuously throughout the U.S. was valuable for such an operation.); see also
Lichtblau, supra note 53 (regarding American officials' statements that "Al Qaeda's
leadership was apparently intrigued by Mr. Padilla's being an American citizen who
might have an easier time of gaining entry to the United States than other Qaeda
members."). See generally Sweet, supra note 40 (pointing out Padilla as valued [al-Qaida]
operative because his U.S. citizenship allowed him to travel freely and he never changed
Padilla to his adopted Arab name on his passport).
58 "Even law enforcement officials and counter terrorism experts were skeptical about
whether.., he was even an officially sanctioned Qaeda terrorist." Maureen Dowd,
Summer of All Fears, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A29. In fact, one of the government's
own confidential witnesses in the Mobbs declaration "said he did not believe Padilla was
actually a member of Al Qaeda." Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 573. Additionally, a U.S.
official speaking on condition of anonymity confided to the Washington Post that when
Padilla was visiting Pakistan, he "was not found to be suspicious, nor was he on any
watch list that U.S. agents shared with Pakistan... On the shadow scale Pakistan
security services employ to rank people they have investigated-white, gray and black-al
Muhajir [Padilla] was designated the lowest level of white." Susan Schmidt & Kamran
Khan, Lawmakers Question CIA on Dirty-Bomb Suspect; Administration Officials Wonder
if Ashcroft Was Unduly Alarmist in Arrest Announcement, WASH. POST, Jun. 13, 2002, at

All.
59 "[O]fficials said it was uncertain if Mr. Padilla had the skills to build a bomb or
acquire radiological material." David Johnston et al., Qaeda's New Links Increase Threats
From Far Flung Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 1. The New York Times had already
acknowledged that "the details of the alleged plot were especially sparse on whether the
suspect had any prospect of carrying out a mission that depended on something he
conspicuously did not have: access to radioactive material." Patrick E. Tyler, A Message
In An Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11, 2002, at Al. Additionally, the Mobbs declaration
admits that other intelligence shows Padilla was not a member of Al Qaeda and that
there was no timetable for an attack. See Christopher Newton, PadillaTied to Al Qaeda,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 2002, at 9.
60 Ashcroft Transcript, supra note 46 (giving his position forcefully); see also Director
of Central Intelligence's Threat Breafing, The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving
Dangersin a Complex World (Feb. 11, 2003) at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public-affairs/speec
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III. DESIGNATION AS ENEMY COMBATANTS

Status as an enemy combatant is a product of the laws of
war. 6 1 "The so called law of war is a species of international law
analogous to common law."6 2 The treatment of those captured in
war is a central issue in the law of war. 6 3 The Fourth Circuit
suggested two basic rationales for detaining an enemy
combatant. 64 First is the need to disarm the captured enemy and
prevent him from rejoining the enemy forces, essentially
immobilizing him as a "simple war measure." 65 Secondly, it

hes/dci-speech_02112003.html [hereinafter "DCIBriefing"] (pointing to Jose Padilla as an
al-Qa'ida operative who was allegedly planning operations in the United States and was
seeking to develop a so-called "dirty bomb"). See generally Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 573
(emphasizing Padilla's extended contacts with Al Qaeda officials).
61 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774 (1950) (emphasizing that "executive
power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed,
throughout our history, essential to war-time security"). See generally Tom Brune, Battle
Brews Over Detainees Rights, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 6, 2003, at A18 (discussing Padilla's
status in particular as an enemy combatant as a product of the war on terror); Toni Locy,
Fates Unsure at U.S. Base in Cuba, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2003, at 9A (explaining that by
labeling them enemy combatants, U.S. officials say the detainees are not entitled to legal
rights and can be held as long as the war on terrorism lasts-or, indefinitely).
62 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7 (1942) (argument for petitioners).
63 See generally The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof War,
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (detailing
conditions under which prisoners are to be held); Melysa H. Sperber, Note, John Walker
Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in InternationalHumanitarianLaw
for American Nationals Captured Abroad While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 159, 162 (2003) (discussing the ambiguity inherent in determining the legal
status of American nationals who are captured abroad by the United States military
while fighting with foreign adversary forces like the Taliban or al Qaeda); U.S. Nationals
Detained as Unlawful Combatants, 97 A.J.I.L. 196, 197 (2003) (Sean D. Murphy, ed.)
(discussing enemy combatants in relation to the Geneva Convention).
64 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that detaining
enemy combatants has at least two vital purposes); Toni Locy, Fates Unsure at U.S. Base
in Cuba, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2003, at 9A (citing military officials who say their purpose
[at Camp Delta] is to develop intelligence and detain terrorist operatives who could
threaten the USA); see also David Rennie, Camp Delta Leaves Detainees in Legal Limbo,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 5, 2003, at 4 (suggesting that to America, the primary
purpose of Camp Delta is extracting intelligence from enemy combatants seized in the
worldwide war on terrorism and preventing them from attacking the United States).
65 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465 (explaining the need to detain the enemy once
captured to prevent the combatant from rejoining the fight); Sarah Laitner, Court Rules
on U.S. "Enemy Citizens" FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 2003, at 2 (quoting Attorney
General Ashcroft's rationale that "[d]etention of enemy combatants prevents them from
rejoining the enemy and continuing to fight against America and its allies, and has long
been upheld by our nation's courts, regardless of the citizenship of the enemy
combatant."); see also Benjamin Weiser, Enemy Combatant Fights to Obtain Counsel, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A17 (examining the government's assertion that "[Padilla's]
detention as an enemy combatant is in no sense 'criminal,' and it has no penal
consequences whatsoever.").
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would be unreasonable to require trials on the battlefield.66 Ex
Parte Quirin, the seminal case on enemy combatants, described
differing treatment of captured members of the enemy depending
67
upon whether they had violated the laws of war or not.
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations and also between those
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants
are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by
opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are
subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts
68
which render their belligerency unlawful.
The federal government deemed Hamdi an enemy combatant
sometime after he was captured in Afghanistan. 69 It is not
66 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465-66 (describing how it would be impractical to require
trial during battle); see also Johnson, 339 U.S. at 779 (declaring that "it would be difficult
to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he
is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert
his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at
home."); Associated Press, U.S. Courts Closed to Taliban Held in Cuba, TORONTO STAR,
Mar. 12, 2003, at A14 (quoting John Ashcroft's assertion that "this nation's enemies may
not enlist America's courts to 'divert efforts and attention from the military offensive
abroad to the legal defensive at home."').
67 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (noting reasons for divergence in
treatment between "lawful and unlawful combatants"). But see John Mintz, Justice Says
It Won't Charge U.S. Citizen Moved from Cuba, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at A10 (quoting
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissing concerns over constitutional and
international law violations in the treatment of detainees in the Afghanistan conflict as
"niceties."). See generally Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical
Elements of Military Governance in a MadisonianDemocracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649,
738-41 (2003) (discussing military tribunals under the laws of war); Henry Weinstein,
Prisoners May Face 'Legal Black Hole" L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at 1 (stating that
detainees' status is governed by a 1950 case involving the fate of 21 Germans captured in
China at the end of World War II and convicted of espionage by a U.S. military
commission).
68 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31 (citing to, among other things, Great Britain,
War Office, Manual of Military Law, ch. xiv, §§ 445-451; 7 Moore, Digest of International
Law, § 1109; 2 Hyde, International Law, §§ 654, 652; and 2 Halleck, International Law
(4th ed. 1908) § 4).
69 As the Court stated:
"[A]n affidavit from the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Michael Mobbs.... confirms... that Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan by allied
military forces during the course of the sanctioned military campaign, designated an
"enemy combatant" by our Government, and ultimately transferred to the Norfolk
Naval Brig for detention. Thus, it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in
Afghanistan during a time of armed hostilities there. It is further undisputed that the
executive branch has classified him as an enemy combatant."
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461. For a contrast with a defendant not given "enemy combatant
status" and some of the consequences of imputing a defendant with "enemy combatant
status," see M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons From the Lindh Case, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 253-54
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completely clear when Hamdi was deemed an enemy combatant.
However, the Mobbs Declaration states that he was captured on
the battlefield in Afghanistan, 70 and classified as an enemy
combatant by the executive branch 7 1 before it was discovered
that he was a US citizen. 72 Only after it was discovered that he
was an American citizen was his status as an enemy combatant
an issue. 7 3 The conflict between his U.S. citizenship and enemy
status resulted in his transfer from Guantanamo Bay with
questions in the Pentagon about how the government would
handle his situation. 74
On June 9, 2002, one month after federal law enforcement
agents apprehended Jose Padilla, Attorney General Ashcroft
(2002). For insight into the Bush Administration's enemy combatant strategies and
policies, see Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of
Military Governance in a MadisonianDemocracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 759 n.691
(2003).
70 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (stating that "Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan by
allied military forces during the course of the sanctioned military campaign"); see also
Hentoff, supra note 27 (explaining that Hamdi was captured by the Northern Alliance);
Tom Jackman, Judges Uphold U.S. Detention of Hamdi; Courts Must Yield to Military on
'Enemy Combatants,' 4th Circuit Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al (noting that
Hamdi was captured with Taliban forces in Afghanistan).
71 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (noting that "it is further undisputed that the
executive branch has classified him as an enemy combatant"). See generally Lawrence
Hurley, Citizens Can Be Kept in Brig Without Counsel, DAILY REC. (Baltimore), Jan. 9,
2003 (explaining that Hamdi's enemy combatant status justifies his detention); Tom
Jackman, Court Denies Lawyer Access to Man in Brig; Hamdi Attorney Said to Lack Key
Status, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at B07 (quoting the Fourth Circuit's analysis that
Hamdi is an "enemy combatant").
72 See Alan Cooper, Who Speaks for This Man?, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, June 5,
2002 at A6 (acknowledging that Hamdi has not renounced his U.S. citizenship); Kozaryn,
supra note 27, (explaining that after discovering Hamdi was an American citizen they
decided to move him to the brig in North Carolina); see also Tim McGlone, U.S. Must
Explain Why Man is Being Held in Brig, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 15, 2002, at Al (stating
that Hamdi was born in Louisiana to Saudi parents).
73 See generally Nat Hentoff, George W. Bush's Constitution, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.),
Jan. 14, 2003, at 27 (arguing that Hamdi is protected by the Bill of Rights, therefore his
detention is unconstitutional); Matthew Roy, Judge Rules Hamdi Entitled to Rights, Not
Freedom, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 17, 2002, at A4 (suggesting that Hamdi's enemy
combatant status is at odds with his American citizenship); Katherine Q. Seelye, Threats
and Responses: the Detainee; Court to Hear Arguments in Groundbreaking Case of U.S.
Citizen Seized With Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A13 (examining the tension
between Hamdi's status as both an American citizen and a government-declared enemy
combatant).
74 See Terry Joyce, Suspected Taliban Fighter Held in Brig, POST AND COURIER
(Charleston), Aug. 23, 2003, at 1A (refuting contention that Hamdi move to Norfolk was
"surreptitious"); Associated Press, U.S.-born Prisoner Flown From Navy Base in Cuba to
Military Jail in Virginia, GUELPH MERCURY (Ontario), Apr. 6, 2002, at D7 (stating that
Hamdi was the first to be flown out of Gauntanamo Bay due to his citizenship status);
Staff, Justice Won't Charge Second U.S-Born TalibanFighter; Man Faces Indefinite Stay
in Norfolk Brig, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 9, 2002, at Al (noting that Hamdi's status as an
American citizen prompted his move to the Norfolk brig).
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consulted with the acting Secretary of Defense and recommended
that the President label Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant.75
The government kept silent about Jose Padilla until after the
President made that determination 7 6 and transferred Padilla to
the Department of Defense, ostensibly because additional
information was being developed about Padilla's activities and
the Justice Department wanted time to make decisions about
how to handle the case before the information became public. 77
After being designated as an enemy combatant "he was
transferred from the Justice Department to the custody of the
Defense Department." 78 Donna Newman, Padilla's lawyer, was
going to work when she received a cellular phone call telling her
that Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, removed to a brig
in North Carolina, and would no longer have access to a lawyer. 79
Unlike Hamdi, Padilla had no weapons, and was not involved in

75 See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46 (recommending that Padilla be deemed an
enemy combatant); see also The White House To The Secretary Of Defense (June 9, 2002),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnndocs/terrorism/padillabush60902det.pdf
[hereinafter PresidentialOrder] (instructing, at the orders of President George W. Bush,
that Padilla be held as an enemy combatant). See generally Benjamin Weiser, Traces of
Terror: The Courts; U.S. Defends Decision to Move Suspect in "DirtyBomb" Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A15 (noting that Padilla's enemy combatant status was
determined by defense officials).
76 See Presidential Order, supra note 75 (claiming Padilla is in cahoots with Al
Qaeda). See generally Steve Fainaru, Padilla'sAl Qaeda Ties Confirmed, ProsecutorsSay,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A04 (noting that the President determined Padilla's
status); Louis Fisher, War on Terror: Who's Minding the Courts on Rights?, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2003, at M2 (acknowledging that the Fourth Circuit backed President George W.
Bush's authority to determine Padilla's enemy combatant status).
77 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that
although the government had Padilla in custody since May 8, his arrest was announced
on June 10 after he was taken into Defense Department custody); Fleischer Briefing I,
supra note 55 (explaining the government failed to release any information about Padilla
for a month while they developed information and tried to determine what course of
action to take). See generally Schmidt & Khan, supra note 58, (suggesting that the
government disclosed the Padilla arrest at a strategic time to defray criticism of U.S.
intelligence blunders before the World Trade Center Attacks).
78 See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46 (detailing Padilla's transfer). See generally
Patricia Hurtado, Civil Liberties Groups Sue Bush in PadillaCase, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept.
27, 2002, at A47 (pointing out that Padilla was transferred in secret); Greg B. Smith,
American Held in D.C. Nuke Plot; Former Street Thug Eyed Dirty Bomb Hit, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), June 11, 2002, at 3 (calling the move "unusual").
79 See Chris Hedges, Public Lives Speaking for Terror Suspect and for the
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at B2 (detailing Newman's whereabouts when
she learned of Padilla's detention); Patricia Hurtado, Feds Plan To Fight Lawyer Ruling,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2003, at A20 (noting the government's strong opposition to
Newman being allowed to meet with Padilla); Greg B. Smith, Jury Probe Pressed, Dirty
Bomb Suspect Held Illegally, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), June 12, 2002, at 9 (recounting
Newman's assertions that she could meet with Padilla).
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any battle with the U.S. or its allies.8 0 He entered the U.S. with a
valid passport.S1
IV. JUDICIAL SUPPORT OF THEIR DESIGNATIONS AS ENEMY

COMBATANTS IS BEGINNING TO ERODE

The government claims detaining Padilla as an enemy
combatant is constitutional despite the fact that he is an
American citizen.8 2 Attorney General Ashcroft erroneously
asserted "determining that [Jose Padilla] is an enemy combatant
who legally can be detained by the United States military, we
have acted with legal authority both under the laws of war and
clear Supreme Court precedent, which establish that the military
may detain a United States citizen who has joined the enemy and
has entered our country to carry out hostile acts."83 But, in fact,
there is no such clear precedent for holding American citizens as
enemy combatants, nor has there been a case where citizens
charged with violating the laws of war were denied a trial, and

80 See Lyle Denniston, Conflict Builds Over Court's Ruling on Citizen's Wartime
Detention, Critics Say President Got Too Much Leeway, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2003, at
A3 (noting that Padilla was captured on U.S. soil); Nat Hentoff, Bush Accused By Lords of
the Bar, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Sept. 30, 2003, at 24 (pointing out that Padilla was
unarmed and carrying valid identification at the time of his arrest); John Riley, Court OK
to Hold Citizen-Combatants, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2003, at A20 (reiterating that
Padilla and Hamdi were captured under different circumstances).
81 See Bob Drogin, Dirty Bomb Probe Widens, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at 1 (noting
that Padilla got his new passport about two months before his arrest); Chisun Lee,
Sticking Up For The Dirty Bomber, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Oct. 15, 2002, at 25 (remarking
that Padilla's lawyer asserts that his valid passport evidences his innocent intention to
visit his son); Stewart M. Powell, Terror Recruits in U.S. a Danger;FBI Says al-Qaida's
Enlisting of Americans Poses Logistic Problems, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 15, 2002, at
Al (opining that Padilla's possession of a valid passport would make him valuable,
undetectable asset to Al Qaeda).
82 See Lyle Denniston, Fighting Terror; Court OK's Jailing Illegal Combatant, But
Allows Counsel, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al (noting that the President's order to
detain Padilla was an exercise of "maximum authority"); George Edmonson, When Bad
Guy is a Citizen, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 13, 2002, at 1A (suggesting that the United
States Supreme Court may eventually have to decide on the constitutionality of Padilla's
detention); Dan Radmacher, Bush Oversteps Bounds in Padilla Case, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (West Virginia), Dec. 13, 2002, at 4A (questioning the propriety of the court
ruling that allowed George W. Bush to detain Padilla under enemy combatant status).
83 See Ashcroft Transcript,supra note 46 (containing quoted language). See generally
Matt Bivens, Torturously Secretive, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, (calling Ashcroft's
statement "idiocy"); Mark Helm, U.S. Foils 'DirtyBomb' Plot; American Citizen Accused of
Conspiring with al-Qaida to Attack U.S. in Pentagon Custody, TIMES UNION (Albany),
June 11, 2002, at Al (bolstering Ashcroft's statement with Attorney General Larry
Thompson's contention that the U.S. may hold Padilla indefinitely as an enemy
combatant).
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there certainly is no precedent for denying such citizens access to
84
counsel.
Federal District Judge Michael Mukasey affirmed Ashcroft's
assertion, in part, by holding that "the President is authorized
under the Constitution and by law to direct the military to detain
enemy combatants in the circumstances present here, such that
Padilla's detention is not per se unlawful."8 5 Judge Mukasey did
not however approve unfettered power to declare citizens enemy
combatants and ruled that Padilla had a right to counsel in order
to submit evidence supporting his petition, though he would only
review whether the President had "some evidence".8 6 The
Department of Justice attempted to transfer the case to North
Carolina where it would have the luxury of Fourth Circuit
jurisprudence.8 7 However, Judge MukaseyS8 denied the transfer
84 See generally Edward Epstein, Dirty Bomb Case Raises Legal Concerns, Questions
Over Consistency of Policy in Terror War, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2002, at A15 (calling the
Bush administration's policy decisions on terror suspect detention "inconsistent"); John
Hendren, Alleged Bomb Plotter to Be Held Indefinitely, Pentagon Says, L.A. TIMES, June
11, 2002, at A18 (asserting that Ashcroft relied on World War II - related cases as
precedent for holding Padilla); Staff, Editorial, They Caught Him, Now What?, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 13, 2002, at A12 (suggesting that the laws relevant to this matter are
unclear).
85 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (summarizing legal
findings). See generally Richard A. Serrano, Judge: PadillaArrest Legal, Defense Given
Right To Visit Terror Suspect, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 5, 2002, at 21A
(calling the decision a victory for both the Bush administrations and concerned civil
libertarians); Padilla Ruling a Mixed Bag, DENVER POST, Dec. 10, 2002, at B06 (opining
that the court ruling supports the Bush administration exertion of power to detain
Padilla).
86 See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (giving a summary of the legal findings); Mark
Hamblett, Fallout From Terrorism, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 2003, at 30 (noting that while the
government initially denied judicial review of an enemy combatant declaration, this
position was eventually relaxed); see also Mark Hamblett, Government Insists Alleged
Dirty Bomber Has Few Rights, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 2003, at 1 (stating that "the 'some
evidence' standard presupposes a predicate set of procedural protections of which Padilla
received none, the district court had no basis for employing the 'some evidence'
standard").
87 The court has been described as "not only conservative but also bold and muscular
in its conservatism." Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES, March 9,
2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 40. "It pushes the envelope of conservative doctrine." Padilla,233
F. Supp 2d at 610. Perhaps even more pertinent to the government's attempt to transfer
the case to the Fourth Circuit was the extreme deference the Fourth Circuit showed the
Bush administration in deciding whether Yaser Hamdi could be deemed an enemy
combatant. Id. Padilla's fate would be a foregone conclusion at the mercy of the Fourth
Circuit. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002).
88 The Honorable Michael B. Mukasey contact information is available at
http://www.nysd.uscour
ts.gov/judges/USDJ/mukasey.htm. Judge Mukasey is a Chief Judge in the Southern
District of New York and on New York Senator Chuck Schumer's list of acceptable
candidates to be recommended to President Bush if there is a United States Supreme
Court vacancy. See They Have A Little List, N.Y. POST, June 22, 2003, at 024; see also Neil
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motion and required the government to comply with his order to
allow Padilla to meet with counsel.8 9 The government's
reluctance to comply with Judge Mukasey's order frustrated
him90 and prevented him from rendering a decision. However,
"[h]e suggested that he was ready to approve the detention if only
the government would allow [Padilla to meet with counsel]."91
The government has refused to comply with two orders to allow
defense counsel to meet with Padilla and was certified for
interlocutory appeal on his final order. 92
The Second Circuit recently held "that the President does not
have the power Under Article II of the Constitution to detain as
an enemy combatant an American citizen seized on American soil
outside a zone of combat." 93 This reversed that portion of Judge
Mukasey's opinion upholding the legality of detaining Enemy
combatants. Specifically they reversed the portions of Mukasey's
A. Lewis, Democrat Urges Bush to Consult on Supreme Court Choice, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
June 17, 2003, at 5.
89 See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (denying the government's transfer motion and
allowing Padilla to meet with counsel only under circumstances which would prevent
Padilla from using counsel to convey messages to outside parties); see also Hamdi, 296
F.3d at 283 (accepting the Government's argument that the detainee had no general right
under the laws of war nor the Constitution to meet with counsel without military
supervision); Alejandra Rodriguez, Comment, Is the War on Terrorism Compromising
Civil Liberties? A Discussionof Hamdi and Padilla,39 CAL. W. L. REV 379 (2003) (noting
"an enemy combatant is afforded none of the guarantees provided for in the
Constitution").
90 Exasperated by new arguments presented against Padilla's meeting with counsel,
Judge Mukasey said 'What I want to know [is] if I decide this motion now am I going to
get another submission that says, 'Gee Judge, we've got some additional facts, to add to
our additional facts'?" Benjamin Wieser, Judge is Angered by U.S. Stance in Case of Dirty
Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 16, 2003, at A16. Judge Mukasey's recent ruling made clear that
he expected his order to be followed: "Lest any confusion remain, this is not a suggestion
or a request that Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and it is certainly not an
invitation to conduct a further 'dialogue" about whether he will be permitted to do so. It is
a ruling-a determination-that he will be permitted to do so." Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243
F. Supp. 2d 42, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safeguarding The
Enemy Within: The Need For ProceduralProtectionsFor U.S. Citizens Detained As Enemy
Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2583-85 (2003).
91 Benjamin Wieser, Judge Affirms Terror Suspect Must Meet with Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A17 (reporting Judge Mukasey's efforts to arrange for Padilla's
meeting with counsel despite government obfuscation).
92 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting the
government the right to appeal the order allowing Padilla to meet with defense counsel).
See generally Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Note, Stacking the Deck Against Suspected
Terrorists: The Dwindling ProceduralLimits on the Government's Power to Indefinitely
Detain United States Citizens As Enemy Combatants, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 669
(2003) (discussing the recent developments in enemy combatant case law); Irma Alicia
Cabrera Ramirez, Comment, Unequal Treatment of United States Citizens: Eroding the
Constitutional Safeguards, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 207, 216-18 (2003) (recanting
Padilla's factual and procedural background).
93 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S App. LEXIS 25616, at *5 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2003).
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opinion finding statutory support for holding Jose Padilla as an
enemy combatant. 94 However, they limited their review only to
American citizens capture in the United States and not those
captured in a zone of combat or on the battlefield. 95 This
distinguishes Padilla's case from that of Yaser Hamdi.
Chief Judge Wilkinson,96 writing for the Fourth Circuit along
with Judge Wilkins and Judge Traxler, supported the
government's detention of Yaser Hamdi as an enemy
combatant. 9 7 The court held that the Mobbs Declaration alone
was sufficient, under the circumstances, to justify Yaser Hamdi's
detention as an enemy combatant. 9 8 Previously, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's order to allow appointed
public defender Frank Dunham unmonitored access to Hamdi as
defense counsel. 9 9 The judges added that "[n]o further factual
inquiry is necessary or proper, and... remand[ed] the case with
94 Id. at 78-79.
95 Id. at 44.
96 In a review by Judicature that evaluated possible Supreme Court nominees Judge
Wilkinson was found to be the most conservative out of the six reviewed and is viewed as
"exceptionally conservative." See Sontag, supra note 87, at 40; see also Robert Levy,
Editorial, A FederalStatute and the U.S. Constitution Prohibit What the Executive Branch
is Doing to Jose Padilla, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at 39; Robin Toner & Neil A.
Lewis, Lobbying Starts As Groups Foresee Vacancy On Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003,
at 1.
97 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 477 (4th Cir. 2003). In my view it is odd that
a case of this magnitude was not heard en banc. See HM Holdings, Inc. v. Rankin, 72 F.3d
562, 563 (7th Cir. 1995) for a discussion of the standard for en banc review of a matter, in
which the Court held that en banc review is reserved for matters of "exceptional
importance." For additional commentary, see Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., where
Judge Posner notes that en banc hearings are rarely granted because they impose "a
heavy burden on an already overburdened court." 723 F.2d 1324, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (Posner, J., concurring).
98 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 450 (concluding Hamdi's capture in a foreign theatre of
war was sufficient to give the President the power to detain Hamdi as an enemy
combatant under his war powers); see also Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that the Mobbs Declaration "sets forth a redacted version of
facts provided to the President as the basis for the conclusions set forth in [the
detainment order]"); U.S. Nationals DetainedAs Unlawful Combatants,supra note 63, at
197 (noting that Courts will search a Mobbs Report for adequacy and may require the
Government to provide additional information in order to allow detention of a U.S.
national deemed "unlawful combatant").
99 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460-61(discussing the decision to reverse the order a as a
matter of national security and deference to the executive branch); Bob Franken & Laura
Bernardini, Second American Taliban' to Get Lawyer, CNN.com Law Center (May 30,
2002) at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
LAW/05/29/hamdi.hearing (reporting the district court's decision to allow counsel to have
unfettered access to Hamdi which was quickly overturned); see also Kacprowski, supra
note 92, at 651-52 (noting that in reviewing District Court decisions, both the Hamdi and
Padilla Courts applied Ex Parte Quirin to allow detention of U.S. citizens as "enemy
combatants" without access to counsel).
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directions to dismiss"10 0 Hamdi's writ of habeas corpus.Ol The
Department of Justice applauded the decision as a victory
supported by precedent. 102
V. Ex PARTE QUIRIN

The courts have looked to Ex Parte Quirinl03 to analyze this
During the Second World War four members of
conflict.
04
Germany's Third Reich received training in sabotage school1
05
and entered the U.S. on Long Island in the cover of darkness.p
A German submarine dropped them off on or around June 13,
1942 with explosives and orders from the German High
Command to destroy war facilities and industries. 0 6 They then
discarded their military uniforms, buried them and continued on
in civilian clothing to New York City.10 7 Five days later, four of
their compatriots landed on Ponta Verda Beach, Florida with the

100 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459 (holding that "the submitted declaration is a
sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the Commander in Chief has constitutionally
detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the United States
Constitution").
101 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2003) for an outlining of the requirements and procedure for
the use of a writ of habeus corpus. For a caselaw discussion of the denial of habeus corpus
to detainees being held in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, see Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2003).
102 The Attorney General stated:
I applaud today's decision which reaffirms the President's authority to capture and
detain individuals, such as Hamdi, who join our enemies on the battlefield to fight
against America and its allies. Today's ruling is an important victory for the
President's ability to protect the American people in times of war. Preserving the
President's authority is crucial to protect our nation from the unprincipled,
unconventional, and savage enemy we face. Detention of enemy combatants prevents
them from rejoining the enemy and continuing to fight against America and its allies,
and has long been upheld by our nation's courts, regardless of the citizenship of the
enemy combatant.
Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on the Fourth
Circuit Decision in the Yaser Hamdi Case (Jan 8, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/20
03/January/03 ag_004.htm; see also Michael Kirkland, Court Dismisses Hamdi Lawyers,
UNITED PRESS INTL, Jan. 8, 2003; Sarah Laitner, Court Rules On U.S. 'Enemy' Citizens,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 2003, at 2.
103 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
104 See id. at 21 (describing Nazi sabotage school in Berlin where saboteurs received
training in explosives and methods of secret writing).
105 See id. at 21 (describing the Nazi saboteurs entry in to the U.S.).
106 See id. (noting that the officers had explosives and were following orders to attack
military targets in the United States).
107 See id. (describing how officers discarded their uniforms and continued on in
civilian clothing, violating the laws of war).
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same mission and equipment.OS The F.B.I. apprehended all of
the individuals in New York and Chicago.109 Subsequently, the
0
President directed that they be tried by military commission.n1
The saboteurs challenged the President's power to make such a
declaration and assert jurisdiction by a military tribunal.111
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, upheld the
government's decision to try the saboteurs by military tribunal
even though two claimed American citizenship.11 2 The court
determined that trying Nazi saboteurs by military tribunal was
within the President's War Powers because the U.S. was engaged
in a declared war,1 1 3 the saboteurs were members of the
enemy,"U4 and they had violated the laws of war by attempting to
carry out attacks in the United States."iD The Court held, "that
those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy
territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for
the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or
property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as
such by military commission."1 6 Haupt, one of the defendants,
argued that as a United States naturalized citizen he could not
be tried by a military tribunal." 7 The Court, without deciding
108 See id. (noting these saboteurs also carried explosives, fuses, incendiary and
timing devices and upon landing ashore, buried their uniform caps and continued on to
other parts of United States).
109 See id. (commenting that when arrested, officers possessed large amounts of U.S.
currency that was given to them by the German Government in Sabotage School).
110 See id. at 22 (stating that the President "appointed a Military Commission and
directed it to try petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War").
111 See id. at 24 (discussing petitioners' main contention that President lacked
statutory or constitutional authority to order a military tribunal for offenses charged).
112 It is interesting to note that five of the nine justices that decided this case also
approved Japanese detention in Korematsu two years later; perhaps not the civil
libertarian's jurists of choice. For a comparison see, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), where Justices Stone, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas approved detention
camps in the United States, and Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1-48, where Justices Stone,
Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Byrnes, and Jackson upheld military
tribunals for a U.S. Citizen.
113 See Quirin, 317 U.S at 21 (emphasizing that petitioner's acts were carried out
after declaration of war between United States and Germany).
114 See id. at 21 (describing the saboteurs as members of the German military who
entered the United States wearing German uniforms under orders from the German
military).
115 See id. at 30-31 (exemplifying an unlawful combatant as "[an enemy combatant
who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property').
116 Id. at 35 (justifying this precept of the law of war based on its recognition in the
U.S. and abroad).
117 Petitioners relied on the argument that the law of war can never be applied to a
United States citizen who upholds the authority of the government. See id. at 45.
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whether he was a citizen, upheld his trial by military tribunal
because he violated the laws of war.
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent
does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency
which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war.
Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of
the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy
18
belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention.1
Thus, U.S. citizens violating the laws of war will be considered
enemy combatants.1 19 However, the Court did not address the
treatment of citizens that were lawful enemy combatants.
Instead, the Court stated that lawful combatants could be
detained as prisoners of war without considering the treatment
of U.S. Citizens held as lawful combatants.120
VI. THE NATURE OF OUR CONFLICT WITH AL QAEDA MAKES
QUIRIN INAPPLICABLE

The initial challenge in declaring enemy combatant status for
an individual is identifying the enemy the United States is in
conflict with, which warrants applying the laws of war. 121 A
Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five years old; it is
contended that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the
naturalization of his parents during his minority and that he has not since lost his
citizenship. The Government, however, takes the position that on attaining his
majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship, or in any case
that he has by his conduct renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship.
Id. at 20.
118 Id. at 37-38 (concluding the petitioner was charged with entering the United
States as an enemy belligerent).
119 See id. at 37 (stating "citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent
does not relieve him from consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful"); see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that American citizen who
took "up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war" was an enemy
combatant).
120 See Quirin,317 U.S. at 31 (basing jurisdiction on the saboteurs allegiance to NAZI
Germany and their violations of their violation of the laws of war); Hamdi, 316 F.3d at
475 (stating "the privilege of citizenship entitles [petitioner] to a limited judicial inquiry
into his detention"); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 592 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (noting
"[1]awful combatants may be held as prisoners of war, but are immune from criminal
prosecution by their captors for belligerent acts that do not constitute war crimes").
121 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46 (deferring to rule on jurisdictional issues and finding it
is sufficient petitioners were within boundaries and charged with being enemies and
violated law against war); Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476 (holding that a finding enemy
combatant status coupled with capture in zone of active combat operations was sufficient
to refuse habeas relief). See generally Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C.

2004]

U.S. CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS

formal declaration of war is not necessary to apply the laws of
war, 12 2 but there must at the very least be a state of war 12 3 and
an appropriate enemy. 12 4 September 1 1 th and the other acts of
terrorism attributed to Al Qaeda125 constitute acts of war. 126
However, Al Qaeda is not a state actor nor a "dissident force"
under protocol II of the Geneva Convention so there is a question

Cir. 2003) (defining enemy in response to attacks on September 11, 2001, as "those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the attacks").
122 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801) (stating the application of the laws of
war do not require an explicit act by Congress); Evans, supra note 26, at 10 (stating "The
Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that a state of war may exist without a
formal declaration"). See generally WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS,
668 (2d ed. 1920) (discussing authority of President to resist attack prior to Congress
declaring war "and in this armed meeting and resistance there is war").
123 See Talbot, 5 U.S. at 28 (noting that laws of war apply when Congress authorizes
"partial hostilities"); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 771
(2003) (clarifying that courts generally "look to both the fact of actual hostilities and the
recognition of such a state, not necessarily through a declaration of war, by the executive
and legislative branches").
124 See Evans, supra note 26, at 12 n.28; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational
Armed
Conflicts
(June
8,
1977)
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/94.htm [hereinafter Protocol I1]. Protocol II provides
for applying law of war protections to conflicts between a state's "armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Id. at Art.
1(1); see also William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors In Non-International
Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 907, 915 (2003). However, even "in cases not
covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the
principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." Protocol II, supra, at
pmbl.
125 See Evans, supranote 26, at 12 n.29. September 11th was one attack in a series of
continued escalating attacks attributable to Al Qaeda. Id. Hence, even before September
11th the United States was in armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Id. The following attacks,
which are attributable to Al Qaeda, evidence that Al Qaeda is an organized enemy: the
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the U.S. military barracks at Khobar, Saudi Arabia
in 1996, U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole
explosion in 2000. Id. See David Johnston, U.S. Says Evidence Possibly Ties Al Qaeda to
the Attack in Kenya, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at Al, for an explanation of some of the
evidence linking Al Qaeda to the attacks in Kenya, specifically the discovery of closely
sequenced serial numbers on missile launchers. For a description of the current and new
threats against the U.S. by Al Qaeda as a pattern of behavior by Al Qaeda, see Philip
Shenon, Ridge Takes to TV to Describe Terror Threats as 'Nothing New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2002, at A12.
126 See Evans, supra note 26, at 12 n.30. Both the United Nations and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization recognized these as acts of war in their responses. The U.N.
recognized the United States' right to self-defense in resolution U.N.S.C. Res. 1368 (2001)
and NATO's North Atlantic Council expressed solidarity against future attacks. See
SCOR Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001); see also
Speech by Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland at the UN General Assembly (Sept. 20,
2002), at http://www.vm.eeleng/natolkat_140/2853.html.
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about applying the laws of war here at all.1 27 Al Qaeda is a
criminal network and those associating with them could be dealt
with in federal district court as they have been before.128
Whether or not the law of war may be applied to some of the acts
committed by Al Qaeda, Quirin's application is limited to the
enemy combatants captured during a war with an enemy
state. 129 The Court in Quirin emphasized that the saboteurs' acts
followed a declaration of war with Germany30 and focused on
their membership in the German military.131 The government
has attempted to decree Padilla is an enemy combatant for his
an international terrorist
Qaeda,
association with Al
organization, by stretching Quirin's holding beyond its logical
limit.132

Expanding Quirin's applicability to encompass terrorism is
imprudent for two reasons. First, affiliating individuals with a
nation in order to determine that they were enemy combatants
127 See Evans, supra note 26, at 12 n.28 (questioning whether the United States must
treat those responsible for the September llth attacks as "common criminals"); see also
Protocol II, supra note 124, at Art. 1(1) (setting forth Protocol I's material field of
application). See generally Michael H. Hoffman, TerroristsAre Unlawful Belligerents,Not
Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction With Implications for the Future of International
HumanitarianLaw, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 227, 228 (2002) (calling an attempt to
define the status of those non-state actors involved in September 11th a "venture into
unchartered legal terrain").
128 See Evans, supra note 26, at 12 n.28 (stating that states have preferred to treat
terrorists as criminals instead of affording them the protections of the Geneva
Conventions); see also United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D.Va. 2002)
(charging John Phillip Walker Lindh with carrying an explosive during the commission of
a felony); United States v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (trying a
terrorist for conspiring, while outside the United States, to kill U.S. nationals, conspiracy
to murder, conspiracy to destroy, by means of fire or explosive, buildings and property of
the United States and conspiracy to attack national defense utilities).
129 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942) (setting the rules for how and when
enemy combatants can apply for writs of habeas corpus). See generally Kacprowski, supra
note 92, at 654-58 (discussing Ex Parte Quirin); Lepri, supra note 90, at 2568-75 (stating
that "the doctrine produced by Quirin itself is hazy and highly fact-specific").
130 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21 (noting saboteurs' acts were "after the declaration of
war between the United States and the German Reich"). See generally Kacprowski, supra
note 92, at 655-56 (classifying Ex Parte Quirin as a primary case); Lepri, supra note 90, at
2568-69 (recanting the facts of Ex Parte Quirin).
131 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21 (noting that the individuals were dropped of by a
German military vessel, were wearing German military uniforms when they landed and
were carrying orders from the German High Command). See generally Kacprowski, supra
note 92, at 655-56 (positing that the saboteurs were "under instructions from the Third
Reich"); Lepri, supra note 90, at 2568-69 (describing the judicial origins of enemy
combatants).
132 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (disclosing that the
President designated Padilla an enemy combatant). See generally Kacprowski, supra note
92, at 653 n.13 (discussing the expansion of Quirin); Lepri, supra note 90, at 2584-88
(detailing how Quirin offers little guidance in the current conflict).
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had certain indicia of reliability not present here.133 Membership
within a nation's military is easily verifiable, unlike any terrorist
affiliation.13 4 The danger of individuals being misidentified as
enemy combatants involved with terrorist organizations is very
real, especially with the low "some evidence standard."135
Abdallah Higazy, the Egyptian student accused of coordinating
the attack on September 11th with a pilot radio found in his
room, would have been detained as an enemy combatant if the
President had issued such a decree.1 3 6 With physical evidence
planted in his room, his close proximity to the attack, his race,
and his coerced confession, a designation as an enemy combatant
would pass "some evidence" with flying colors.13 7 Innocent
individuals such as Higazy, if deemed a combatant, detained
133 See Jerry Bitts, Letters, Beware of Ashcroft and His Big Brother, LAS VEGAS REV.J., Aug. 27, 2003, at 8B (warning people to watch out for John Ashcroft, in part, because
of the government's ability to indefinitely detain U.S. citizens, without counsel, "based on
non-reviewable executive determinations that the individuals" are enemy combatants,
when the term "enemy combatants" is so broad "that even demonstrators might be
considered 'terrorists"'); see also Miguel Angel Gutierrez, The Two Post WTC Scenarios,
World Future Society (2001), at http://www.wfs.org/mmgutengl.htm (stating that "the lack
of clarity regarding enemy identification is demonstrated by the difficulty in determining
the targets"). But see George Lardner Jr., Legal Scholars Criticize Wording of Bush Order;
Accused Can Be Detained Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at A10 (reporting a
November 13 Presidential Order grants the President the authority to determine himself
who is to be brought before a military tribunal).
134 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21 (noting that wearing German uniforms, while not
conclusive, is very telling of your affiliation in a military organization); Gutierrez, supra
note 130 (stating there is a lack of clarity for enemy identification). See generally David
Costello, Iraq Blows Up In U.S. Face, COURIER MAIL (Australia), Aug. 21, 2003, at 17
(arguing Iraq is an identifiable magnet for terrorists because "[t]he place is a chaotic mess
where terrorists can melt into the population with little fear of discovery").
135 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 42, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that only a
"some evidence standard," i.e., that "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the
findings [are] without support or otherwise arbitrary," is required to find enemy
combatant status); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (holding that
the Due Process Clause requires a some evidence standard for certain prison disciplinary
board decisions); United States ex. rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103,
106 (1927) (holding that deportation on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial
of due process).
136 See Robert Gearty, Suspect Held Over 9/11 Radio Is Suing the FBI, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Dec. 13, 2002, at 36 (reporting that he was suing for $20 million because the FBI
polygrapher "coerced him into making a false confession"); see also Patricia Hurtado,
Lawsuit in Pilot-Radio Case; Man Sues Hotel, Worker, FBI Agent Over Wrongful Terror
Charge, NEWSDAY (N.Y), Dec. 13, 2002, at A19 (stating Higazy was arrested because
"Ronald Ferry, a former hotel security guard, claimed to have found the radio in a locked
safe in Higazy's 51st-floor [hotel] room"); Greg Smith, Judge Rips Gov't Over FBI Botch,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Nov. 26 2002, at 25 (noting that the pilot's radio was capable of
communicating with commercial airplanes).
137 See id. (stating that "his Manhattan hotel room overlook[ed] the World Trade
Center"); see also Gearty, supra note 136 (naming Michael Templeton as the person who
coerced the confession); Hurtado, supra note 136 (adding that Higazy was 32 years old).
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incommunicado, and denied access to counsel, would be hopeless.
Who among us would be safe?
The second troubling aspect of this expansion is the indefinite
nature of the conflict.138 Enemy combatants can be held until the
end of the conflict. 139 A normal war has a marked end, such as a
treaty, withdrawal, or surrender. If our conflict is to be with
terrorism, a method of warfare rather than a conflict, there will
never be any resolution.1 40 The federal district court reviewing
Hamdi's detention asked, "Will the war never be over as long as
there is any member or any person who might feel that they
want to attack the United States of America or the citizens of the
United States of America?"141 The ACLU in briefs for both
Hamdi and Padilla argues that the indefinite detention is
2
unjustified.14
Both these concerns bear directly on Padilla's status as an
enemy combatant. As noted previously, the government's own
confidential witness in the Mobbs declaration "said he did not
believe Padilla was actually a member of Al Qaeda." 143 There is
138 See Staff, Our View, TIMES HERALD (MI), May 26, 2003, at 11A (commenting on
how the "war on terrorism is fluid with new fronts emerging"); see also Trophy Terrorism,
TIMES (London), May 17, 2003, at 27 (asking whether "the West [is] now facing an
indefinite war on terrorism for which it has formulated no strategy"). See generally Nat
Hentoff, Ashcroft Out of Control, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Mar. 11, 2003, at 29
(characterizing the war on terrorism as indefinite).
139 See News Release No. 497-02, U.S. Dept. of Defense, DOD Responds to ABA
at
available
2,
2002)
(Oct.
Report
Combatant
Enemy
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002blOO22002_bt
497-02.html (responding to the ABA's accusation that Hamdi and Padilla are being
indefinitely detained, the Department of Defense argued that the Geneva Convention
allows for their detention until the end of the conflict, that any concern for holding them
too long is premature and the government has no interest in holding them longer than
necessary). See generally ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 2, 6-9 (arguing that the
indefinite detention is unlawful); Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et
al. at 6-10, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445)
(arguing that the indefinite detention is unlawful) [hereinafter ACLU BriefI1].
140 See Bruce Felmingham, Understanding Islam the Key to Peace, SUNDAY
TASMANIAN (Australia), Mar. 23, 2003 (appealing to the West's unwillingness to
understand terrorism and "[m]isunderstanding number one is that terrorism is not an
enemy, but a method of warfare employed by an enemy"). See generally Mike Allen, Bush
To Seek Slower Growth In Spending As Costs Of War Rise, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at
A08 (referring to the war on terrorism as indefinite).
141 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 2003) (questioning ongoing
hostilities between United States and foreign nations).
142 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 469 (illustrating ACLU's arguments regarding Hamdi's
detention); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing ACLU's
argument that Padilla's detention was unlawful); see also supra notes 30, 32-33, 136 and
accompanying text (citing and discussing both briefs).
143 Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (specifying that government's confidential witness
did not believe Padilla was a terrorist).
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no clear indication Padilla is associated with Al Qaeda,144 unlike
the soldiers in Quirin.145 Any initial determination as to whether
Padilla is in fact a member of Al Qaeda has been rendered
impossible by the government's refusal to allow Padilla to meet
with counsel in order to submit evidence to the contrary. 146
Additionally, defining him as a member of Al Qaeda would mean
that he could be detained indefinitely.14 7 Al Qaeda is an
organization with no clear hierarchal structure, a fluid
membership, and a lack of geographic boundaries.148
The second circuit found Quirin inapplicable to Padilla's
detention for two main reasons. First they found congressional
authority supported the Quirin court's decision regarding
military jurisdiction unlike the detention of Padilla. 149 In fact
current legislation, not enacted during the Quirin decision,
specifically prohibits the detention of citizens without
144 "Even law enforcement officials and counter terrorism experts were skeptical
about whether.., he was even an officially sanctioned Qaeda terrorist." Dowd, supra note
58. "Without some reality check, there is no way to have confidence that Mr. Padilla is
what the government claims." Editorial, Alleged But Not Proven, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
2002, at B06. But see James D. Zirin, When States Turn Assassin, TIMES (London), Feb.
11, 2003, at 10, for an claims that "[w]hile [Padilla is] not a member of al-Qaeda, he had
extended contacts with al-Qaeda operatives and acted under the direction of Abu
Zubaydah, bin Laden's second in command" when, while he was in an Al Qaeda safe
house in Pakistan, he researched dropping a "dirty atomic bomb" on the United States.
145 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942) (holding that petitioners clearly were
allies of German Reich despite American citizenship); Kacprowski, supra note 92, at 65556 (stating that the defendants were "under instructions from the Third Reich"); see also
Lepri, supra note 90, at 2568-69 (discussing the facts of Quirin).
146 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (noting that the government prohibited
communication between Padilla and his counsel during detention); Levy, supra note 93
(contrasting the treatment of Nazis with Padilla). See generally Radmacher, supra note 82
(noting that Padilla's attorney has not seen or spoken with him since he has been in the
custody of the military).
147 See Helm, supra note 83 (giving Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson's view
that as an enemy soldier Padilla can be held indefinitely); Locy, supra note 61 (explaining
the government's position that a detainee's label of enemy combatant means that the
detainee has no legal rights); see also Fleischer Briefing I, supra note 55 (responding to
the question of whether the President believed that an American citizen could be declared
an enemy combatant and held indefinitely, Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesperson,
stated "According to the lawyers, under the statute, this can last for the duration of the
war.").
148 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 437 (2002) (delving into the psyche of terrorists based upon Bin
Laden's cult-like indoctrination that extends to Muslim countries all over the world);
Michael Evans, Al-Qaeda Is Now 'As Great a Threat as it Was Before September 11, TIMES
(London), May 14, 2003, at 16 (discussing how the al-Qaeda network extends to countries
all over the world); see also Jason Burke, What is al-Qaeda?, OBSERVER, July 13, 2003
(explaining the structure and organization of al-Qaeda network), available at
http://observer.guardian.co.uklworldview/story/0, 11581,996509,00.html.
149 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616, at *59 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2003).
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congressional authorization. 150 Second, as previously mentioned,
the petitioners in Quirin admitted their affiliation with a
declared enemey but in Padilla's case there is no such admission.
Hamdi's affiliation with a Taliban military unit raises a
different set of issues. Like the combatants in Quirin, his
membership in a Taliban unit appears uncontested.151 However,
the government and the court blur the line as to who is the
enemy. The federal district court asked, '"With whom is the war I
should suggest we're fighting?"152 The government stated that
Hamdi was captured with Taliban forces, and yet the Fourth
Circuit's opinion speaks at length about terrorist acts committed
by Al Qaeda. 15 3 If in fact Al Qaeda is the entity the United States
is supposedly at war with, there is little evidence that Hamdi had
any involvement with them. He has only been accused of being
in a Taliban military unit.15 4 There has been no link between
him and Al Qaeda, even on the level of the bare assertions that
hold Padilla.155 If Hamdi is to be held until the end of the conflict
he should at least be informed which conflict he is waiting out.

150 Id. at 60-61.
151 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
principle applied in Quirin regarding enemy combatants also applies to Hamdi); Bender,
supra note 28 (noting that Hamdi fought with the Taliban); see also Markon, supra note
30 (claiming that Hamdi fought with the Taliban troops in Afghanistan and was caught
by the Northern Alliance).
152 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (questioning the underpinnings of the government's
allegations that Hamdi is an enemy combatant).
153 See id. at 459-60 ( detailing the attacks of September 11 h which were Al Qaeda
acts not those of the Taliban); Markon, supra note 30 (noting the government's objection);
see also Span, supra note 54 (saying that the government said Hamdi was captured while
fighting with the Taliban).
154 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 472 (finding that Hamdi undoubtedly trained to be in the
Taliban military, but nothing was noted regarding training for al-Qaeda as well); Markon,
supra note 30 (justifying Hamdi's detention on the grounds that he joined, trained with,
and pledged his loyalty to the Taliban); see also Span, supra note 54 (explaining that
Hamdi was carrying an AK-47 when he surrendered).
155 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476 (concluding that Hamdi is being detained because he
allied with an enemy military during wartime hostilities, not necessarily because of
relations with the al-Qaeda terrorist network); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (clarifying that there is insufficient evidence to find that Padilla was
specifically a member of al-Qaeda); Editorial, Hear From Both Sides, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 2003, at A20 (juxtaposing Hamdi with Padilla).
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VII. YASER HAMDI AND JOSE PADILLA HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF
THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL

"Assuming he was an enemy combatant, he would not be
entitled to counsel?" The judge asked.
"No he would not be entitled to counsel to challenge his
detainment." [U.S. Attny.] Garre answered.
"That sounds idiotic" [judge] Doumar said.156
The Department of Defense has violated Jose Padilla's and
Yaser Hamdi's right to counsel.157 The Sixth Amendment states,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."1 58 The government
correctly points out that the right to counsel does not attach until
an individual has been charged,1 59 and neither Padilla nor
Hamdi have been charged with any crime. 160 However, that fails
to address the issue that Jose Padilla was arrested as a material
witness, which afforded him a statutory right to counsel'61 under
156 Franken & Bernardini, supra note 99 (quoting questions presented by Doumar to
U.S. Attorney at Hamdi's trial).
157 See Padilla,233 F.Supp.2d at 602-04 (concluding that there is an obvious need for
Padilla to consult with counsel); Kacprowski, supra note 92, at 694 (noting that the
Padilla court, decided after Hamdi, acknowledged the presumptive right to counsel in
situations like Hamdi and Padilla); Andrew P. Napolitano, 'Enemy Combatants' Cast into
a Constitutional Hell, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at 17 (describing the government's
argument that Hamdi and Padilla should not be allowed counsel as 'ludicrous').
158 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that all citizens of the United States have a right
to an attorney in criminal proceedings).
159 See State v. Luton, 927 P.2d. 844, 849 (Haw. 1996) (explaining the right to counsel
under the sixth amendment is triggered after judicial proceeding becomes adversarial or
reaches "critical stages of criminal prosecution"); see also Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723
A.2d. 162, 169 (Pa. 1999) (holding that state right to counsel attaches at same time Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at time of adversarial proceedings); 21A AM. JUR.2D
Criminal Law § 1208 (2003) (explaining Sixth Amendment right of counsel does not
attach unless he is formally charged at the time of arrest).
160 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475 (stating that because Hamdi is not charged with any
crime he has no constitutional right to counsel); McGlone, supra note 28 (announcing the
Pentagon's plans not to charge Hamdi with a crime); see also Hentoff, supra note 80
(expressing disgust with President Bush's "arrogance of power" in detaining both Padilla
and Hamdi without charging them with a crime or allowing them access to counsel).
161 18 U.S.C.A § 3006A(a)(1)(G) (2003) states:
§ 3006A. Adequate representation of defendants
(a) Choice of plan. Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial
council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate
representation in accordance with this section. Representation under each plan shall
include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary for adequate
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18 U.S.C.A § 3006A.162 While it is true that "the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is said to be 'case specific',16 3 it has
been held that if the right has attached with respect to a charged
offense, it may also have been triggered for an uncharged but
closely related offense." 164 In other words, the Sixth Amendment
right carries over if the two events are similar and share the
same underlying facts, intent, and conduct.16 5 The FBI held
Padilla in custody as a material witness based on his alleged
involvement with Al Qaeda and a plot to detonate a dirty bomb in
representation. Each plan shall provide the following: (1) Representation shall be
provided for any financially eligible person who-... (G) is in custody as a material
witness
§ 3006A(a)(1)(G). Hence, "Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A §3006A (a)(1)(G), material witnesses
have a statutory right to appointed counsel." Task Force on Treatment of Enemy
Combatants, 2003 A.B.A. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3, at n.7, Feb. 10, 2003,
available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/recommendations03/109.pdf [hereinafter American Bar Association Report].
Class Action Application for Habeus Corpus ex rel. All Material Witnesses also expresses
this idea. 612 F. Supp. 940, 942 (W.D. Tex. 1985). The case held that material witnesses
were entitled to representation appointed by the government as required by the Fifth
Amendment because the risk of mistakenly depriving private interests, the probable
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, as well as the government's
interest, all weigh in favor of appointing counsel for material witnesses who could not
afford to hire counsel. Id. at 942.
162 Since the purpose of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A is to guarantee individuals Sixth
Amendment rights, Jose Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was triggered when
he was arrested at O'Hare. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A, Interpretive Notes and Decisions
1(2). Padilla was in fact granted the right to counsel when originally arrested "pursuant to
a material witness warrant." American Bar Association Report, supra note 161, at 3 n.7.
See Padilla,233 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
163 See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel only attaches to those crimes an individual is charged
with and not to other uncharged offenses); see also United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255,
258 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining the exception of when two charges are "so inextricably
intertwined ...that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be
isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is triggered"). See generally 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1187 (2003)
(stating sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel applies only to offenses with
which defendant has actually been charged).
164 See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1187 (2003) (noting if the right has attached
with respect to a charged offense, it may also have been triggered for an uncharged but
closely related offense); see also Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104 (explaining when the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel triggered it will carry over to other crimes with the same
operative facts).
165 See U.S. v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an individual's
Sixth Amendment right carried over from witness intimidation to attempted murder
because the underlying facts and intent were the same); see also U.S. v. Doherty, 126 F.3d
769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating the right to counsel extends if the investigations are "so
inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for
the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the
uncharged offense"). But see People v. Spivey, 615 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1993) (holding occurrence of two crimes in same apartment building over a year apart was
not enough to constitute extremely close relation as for right to counsel to attach).
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the United States, at which point his right to counsel attached. 166
The government now holds him as an enemy combatant for the
very same reasons; therefore, his right to counsel should carry
over. 167 Additionally, both Padilla and Hamdi may have the right
to request the presence of an attorney during their
interrogation. 168 Interrogation itself would not trigger the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel,169 but Padilla and Hamdi could
assert their right to the presence of counsel during a custodial
71
investigation170 under the Fifth Amendment.1
166 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (stating Padilla's original arrest by the
Department of Justice was due to findings that he had knowledge of facts relevant to a
grand jury investigation into the Sept. 11th attacks and that an attorney was appointed at
that time); Josh Meyer, FBI Issues Global Alert for Suspected Al Qaeda Terrorists, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at 9 (linking Padilla to another suspected Al Qaeda terrorist named
Adnan G. El Shukrijunah who is a 28 year old Saudi native); see also Span, supra note 54
(reiterating facts contained in the Mobbs declaration, specifically that Padilla was trained
in wiring explosives and that his plans to detonate a dirty bomb did not develop further
than the initial planning stages).
167 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001) (noting that "Although it is clear that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only to charged offenses, we have
recognized in other contexts that the definition of an "offense" is not necessarily limited to
the four corners of a charging instrument"); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (stating that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not"); United States v. Medrano, 208 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(explaining that "Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only to a charged offense, as
well as to uncharged offenses that may be said to be the "same offense" under the socalled Blockburger test").
168 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding "It is well established that
a person is entitled to the service of a lawyer at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information or arraignment"); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)
(noting that confessions elicited from the accused after the right to counsel has attached
violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments if elicited outside the presence of counsel);
United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Brewer).
169 See Carrasco, 887 F.2d at 817-18 (holding custodial interrogation alone is not
enough to trigger Sixth Amendment right to counsel); State v. Potter, 478 S.E.2d 742, 750
(W. Va. 1996) (holding that Sixth Amendment is not implicated in custodial interrogation
unless criminal charges have already been filed); see also 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 1208 (2003) (stating "A custodial interrogation does not trigger the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel, unless criminal charges have already been filed").
170 "Custodial interrogation.., means questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
any significant way..." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990). For further
explanation of custodial interrogation, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)
and Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth
Amendment and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 389 n.66 (1993).
171 See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (noting that Fifth Amendment
protections apply to custodial interrogations); Lamp v. Farrier, 763 F.2d 994, 996 (8th Cir.
1985) (outlining the Fifth Amendment right to request presence of an attorney during
custodial interrogation); see also 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1208 (stating that "The
fact that custodial interrogation does not of itself cause the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel to attach does not prevent a suspect in custody from asserting,
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Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi should have the right to counsel
at least in order to aid in the habeas corpus relief and argue
against the initial determinations naming them enemy
combatants.172 The ABA report on enemy combatants called for
the courts to allow Padilla and Hamdi the right to consult with
counsel to request relief.173 Judge Michael Mukasey recognized
this right as fundamental, and on December 4, 2002 held that
Jose Padilla should be permitted to consult with counsel "in aid
of his petition and in particular, in aid of responding to the
Mobbs Declaration which described the factual basis of his
detention... ."174 Instead of complying with the orders, the
government made untimely motions for reconsideration.175 This
exasperated Judge Mukasey,176 who grudgingly reconsidered his

under the Fifth Amendment, his right to the presence of counsel during custodial
interrogation").
172 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 639 (1986) (noting the importance of
counsel after a suspect has become formally accused); Class Action Application for Habeus
Corpus ex rel. All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. 940, 946 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (stating
"the due process requirement of a meaningful opportunity to be heard cannot be met
unless counsel is appointed"); see also American Bar Association Report, supra note 161,
at 10 (stating "[a] citizen or other person lawfully within the United States who is
detained within the United States should not be denied access to the courts for the
purpose of seeking habeas corpus relief").
173 See id. (stating that "he should, at the very least, have the right to contact counsel
and communicate with an attorney in order to facilitate a request for relief"); see also Tim
McGlone, Sudden Move of Hamdi to S.C. Brig Clouds Future; Pentagon Says Action
Meant To Be "Low Key", VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 29, 2003, at B1 (exhibiting public outcry
by numerous groups including the ABA 18 civil liberties groups and 139 legal scholars
who filed court briefs for Hamdi); Henry Weinstein, ABA Opposes Bush 'Enemy
Combatants Policy; U.S. Citizen-Detainees Have A Right To Meet With Lawyers, Bar
Group Says. They Also Should Be Allowed 'JudicialReview' of Their Status, It Adds, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at 18 (dealing with the passage of an ABA resolution to oppose
President Bush's terrorism policy).
174 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 42, 43 (repeating the holding of Padilla v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
175 See id. at 48 (stating "I entered a separate order simply permitting the
government to make a 'written submission,' presumably-again--one that set forth the
facts the government wanted me to consider in determining how it would comply with the
previous determination, not whether it would comply with that determination"); see also
Stuart Taylor Jr., Get Them Their Lawyers Falsely Accused "Enemies" Deserve Due
Process, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at 52 (describing Judge Mukasey's March 11th
opinion, where the government "pressed Mukasey to reverse himself," as "sternly
worded"). See generally Hurtado, supra note 79 (talking about Judge Mukasey's March
11th order).
176 Judge Michael Mukasey is a Chief Judge in the United States District Court in
Manhattan. See Taylor, supra note 170. Judge Mukasey is doing "about as well as could
be done under the current law," id., and is the same judge who presided over the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing case. See Risky Business: Padilla Case Shows Need To
Protect U.S. Citizens _ and Their Civil Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2003, at
Commentary. See supra note 88 for more information regarding Judge Mukasey.
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holdingl77 despite the impropriety of the government's tactics,1 78
and rendered an opinion on March 11, 2003 adhering to his order
that Padilla be permitted to meet with counsel. 1 79 In his opinion,
Judge Mukasey explained that in order for the government to
meet its burden of providing "some evidence" that Padilla is an
enemy combatant, Padilla needs the opportunity to meet with
counsel to submit evidence to the contrary.S 0 However, the
Fourth Circuit denied Hamdi the limited right to counsel to
assure that the enemy combatant designation was proper; it held
that the mere two-page, nine-paragraph, Mobbs Declaration' 8 '
was sufficient evidence to justify holding Hamdi as an enemy
combatant because Hamdi had no right to rebut the factual
assertions in the Mobbs declaration. 8 2 The Fourth Circuit
177 See Padilla,243 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49 (noting the prudential nature of rule 6.3 and
granting reconsideration despite the violation of that rule); Editorial, Get the Message,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A20 (mentioning the tone of Judge Mukasey's opinion in
granting reconsideration to government despite its stall tactics); see also Benjamin
Weiser, Judge Affirms Terror Suspect Must Meet with Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2003, at A17 (illustrating Judge Mukasey's annoyance at revisiting the issue).
178 See Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49 (describing the government's conduct as
violative of local rule 6.3 and noting the government may be stalling to benefit from a
ruling in Hamdi); Dan Mihalopoulos, U.S. Rebuked over Padilla; Judge Says "Dirty
Bomb" Suspect Entitled to Lawyer, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2003, at 1C (branding Judge
Mukasey's opinion a "sharply worded rebuke"); Weiser, supra note 172, at A17
(emphasizing the opinion's impatient tone with the government's failure to comply with
the order to let Padilla meet with his lawyer).
179 See Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (holding Padilla must be permitted to meet
with counsel as the original ruling provided for); Angie Cannon, Taking Liberties, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 2003, at 44 (relating that Mukasey has twice ruled that
Padilla should be allowed to meet with attorney); Mark Hamblett, Judge Sticks by Ruling
on Access of "DirtyBomber" to His Attorneys, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 1 (reporting that
Mukasey refused to reverse his earlier decision).
180 See Padilla,243 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (explaining there is no other way for Padilla to
submit his petition and that the "some evidence" standard requires he be given an
opportunity to refute the claims so that the judge can assure his detention is not
arbitrary); Mihalopoulos, supra note 178, at 1C (presenting the argument that Padilla
needs a lawyer to be able to challenge his status); Weiser, supra note 177, at A17 (noting
the opinion allows Padilla to meet with his attorney in order to challenge his detention).
181 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing that the
"declaration" presented by Michael Mobbs that outlines all of the allegations against
Yaser Hamdi is not even three pages long); Jackman, supra note 70 (noting that a twopage "declaration of facts" signed by Mobbs justified the detention of Hamdi); Katharine
Q. Seelye, Appeals Court Again Hears Case of American Held Without Chargesor Counsel,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A18 (stating that "two page, nine paragraph declaration" by
Michael Mobbs was before the court for determining its sufficiency to support the holding
of Hamdi).
182 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473 (stating that he should not be able to rebut the
government's assertions "because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of
active combat operations in a foreign country and because any inquiry must be
circumscribed to avoid encroachment into the military affairs entrusted to the executive
branch'); Richard Willing, Court Rules Against American Taliban Fighter, USA TODAY,
Jan. 9, 2003, at 6A (quoting Chief Judge Wilkinson that "the review of battlefield captures
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expressly limited its holding to cover only cases where citizens
were captured in a combat zone abroad and not to include
citizens captured on American soil. 183
The Fourth Circuit's deference goes too far by ignoring any
distinction between whether Hamdi was a legal or illegal
combatant. 184 More importantly, despite the fact that Hamdi was
captured with the Taliban, 185 there has been no factual
determination as to whether he was connected with Al Qaeda.
The district court's question, "with whom is the war I should
suggest we're fighting"' 86 remains unanswered18 7 and vital to
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld188 is peppered with
Hamdi's status.
descriptions of September 1 1 th and the U.S.'s continued conflict
But, Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not
with Al Qaeda.
coextensive. 18 9 To hold Hamdi as an enemy combatant using a
in overseas conflicts is a highly deferential one"); see also Lyle Denniston, Court Says
Military May Hold Citizens; Panel Finds Broad Powers for President During Warfare,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al (specifying the portion of the Court's ruling that
Hamdi is not entitled to challenge the facts supporting his detainment).
183 See Hamdi, 31 F.3d at 465 (limiting holding so as not to cover Americans captured
in this country); Jackman, supra note 70 (revealing that holding in Hamdi was limited to
U.S. citizens captured abroad); Willing, supra note 182 (connecting the fact that Hamdi
was captured overseas with ruling that American citizen could be held as "enemy
combatant" without trial).
184 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (holding that the distinction between
lawful and unlawful combatants is that lawful combatants are entitled to a prisoner of
war status, which means they cannot be punished for their participation in war, while
unlawful combatants are given trials by military tribunals to determine whether their
acts were indeed unlawful before they can be punished); Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 469
(recognizing the distinction but stating that it fails to make a difference in the case);
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that the
distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants raises the issue of whether both can
be detained for the remainder of the hostilities).
185 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459 (justifying the holding because Hamdi was caught in
the field of battle); George Edmonson, "Enemy Combatant" Issue Murky; Court Ruling
Keeps One U.S. Citizen Locked Up Incommunicado, but It May Not Necessarily Apply to
Others, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Jan. 10, 2003, at 9A (comparing Hamdi
and Padilla, noting that Hamdi was captured in a combat zone unlike Padilla, who was
captured in the U.S.); Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Born Talib Can Be Denied Trial, Court
Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at 1 (presenting that Hamdi was apprehended in
Afghanistan during conflict).
186 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (questioning underpinnings of the government's
allegations that Hamdi is an enemy combatant).
187 The government's answer was that Hamdi was a member of the Taliban and yet
the justification for detaining him appears to be the conflict with Al Qaeda, see id. at 462,
474, which leaves one wondering whether the Fourth Circuit is unable to distinguish the
two, or whether they are trying to obfuscate the issues so that no one else can. See
generally Serrano, supra note 185; Willing, supra note 182.
188 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
189 See Faye Bowers, How Lindh Is Now Aiding U.S. Terror Fight, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 4, 2002, at 02 (imparting the importance of the distinction of John Walker
Lindh as being associated with the Taliban and not Al Qaeda); see also Tom Bowman &
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warped agency theory because Al Qaeda was located in
Afghanistan at the time leads to ludicrous results. For these
reasons, it is clear that in order to determine whether the
executive branch properly designated Hamdi as an enemy
combatant further inquiry was necessary; and, as Judge
Mukasey stated, the only effective way for such inquiry to occur
is to allow the individual to meet with counsel at least to verify
the initial determination. 190
The right to consult with counsel to refute assertions that
establish military jurisdiction or that one is an enemy combatant
is clearly established by the laws of war, 19 1 which are an
amalgam of past precedent.192 As the ACLU's amicus brief points
out, every previous similar case permitted counsel to assist the
alleged "enemy combatant" in contesting his detention.19 3 This
Gail Gibson, Uncertainty Clouds Fate of Taliban Fighters, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 8,
2001, at A14 (reporting that not all members of the Taliban fighters are members of the
Al Qaeda terrorist network); Katharine Q. Seelye & Bernard Weil, U.S. Shifts Stand on
War Captives, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 8, 2002, at A01 (announcing the decision of the Bush
administration to treat the captured Taliban fighters under the Geneva Convention but
not to extend that treatment to captured Al Qaeda operatives).
190 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (maintaining that
the right to present facts to tribunal necessarily implies a right to meet with counsel);
Jackman, supra note 29 (linking the issue of right to counsel with the issue of challenging
enemy combatant status); David G. Savage, "Enemy" Citizen Jailing Criticized;
Terrorism:Americans As "Combatants"Are Entitled to Counsel, Lawyers Panel Said, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at 11 (noting the ABA argues enemy combatants should have the
right to meet with their attorneys in order to challenge their classification).
191 Jordan J. Paust, Essay: Judicial Power To Determine the Status and Rights of
Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 514 (2003) (stating that
detained combatants have the right to judicial review as to their status); Lepri, supra note
90, at 2572-75 (explicating the origin of the term "enemy combatant" from the term
"unlawful combatant" under international law and observing that there have always been
procedures used to allow those classified as "unlawful combatants" to challenge this
classification through use of an attorney); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary; By
Flouting War Laws, U.S. Invites Tragedy, L.A. TIMES, March 25, 2003, at 13 (arguing the
Geneva Convention mandates a determination by a tribunal is necessary to determine a
detainee's status).
192 See Ex Parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (referring to the laws of war as
"universal agreement and practice"); Ruti Teitel, Human Rights On The Eve Of The Next
Century: Beyond Vienna & Beijing: Human Rights Theory: Human Rights Genealogy, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 303 (1997) (calling the laws of war an "ad hoc blend"); see also
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2003) (stating
that "laws of war" is a "term of art describing the positive and customary international
rules of armed conflict").
193 See ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 18 (stating that in every case where an
individual was alleged to be an enemy combatant he was afforded counsel to contest that
fact); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (commenting that unlawful combatants are entitled
to trials to determine whether their acts were unlawful, implying that a right to the legal
process and to counsel as a guide through that process); Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 54
(highlighting that there is no other practical way to challenge the enemy combatant
status than allowing them to meet with counsel).
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right is more firmly rooted in the law of war than the enemy
combatant status itself.194 In fact, the Quirin Court expressly
held that such individuals had a right to judicial review of their
status:
[The Government] insists that petitioners must be denied
access to the courts, both because they are enemy aliens or
have entered our territory as enemy belligerents, and
because the President's Proclamation undertakes in terms to
deny such access to the class of persons defined by the
Proclamation, which aptly describes the character and
conduct of petitioners. It is urged that if they are enemy
aliens or if the Proclamation has force, no court may afford
the petitioners a hearing. But there is certainly nothing in
the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for
determining its applicability to the particular case. 19 5
VIII. CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY PROSCRIBED SUCH DETENTION OF
U.S. CITIZENS

Congress erected procedural safeguards for our liberty in times
of crisis by enacting 18 U S.C. § 4001 to bar detention without an
act

of

Congress.19 6

During

the

1950's

"Red

Scare,"

our

government met the crisis of the day - communism - by passing
the Emergency Detention Act.197 Provisions within that act had
194 Individuals facing trial by military tribunal have been afforded counsel 100% of
the time. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 5; see also In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1942); Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 41 (1866); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir.
1956); In Re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 142 (9th Cir. 1946). This is not the case with
individuals receiving an "enemy combatant status," a term which "appeared nowhere in
U.S. criminal law, international law or in the law of war... [but] appears to have been
appropriated from Ex Parte Quirin." American Bar Association Report, supra note 161; see
also Gary Solis, Even a "BadMan" Has Rights, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at A19.
195 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 11.
196 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2003) (stating "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."); Robyn Blumner,
Did PresidentOverstep in Detaining Suspects?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 22, 2002, at
11A (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 4001 was passed to ensure the executive branch was not
able to hold citizens without charge during national emergencies); see also Beverley
Lumpkin, Detention Law: "Enemy Combatants" and 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) (July 20, 2002) at
(noting the
http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/hallsoustice/hallsofiusticel31.html
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) indicates Congress's goal was to ensure the
detainment of citizens only would occur only in conformity with the laws they enact).
197 See ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 17-18 (explaining that the Emergency
Detention Act was passed at the height of the "Red Scare"); see also Karen Brandon &
Vincent J. Schodolski, Safety's Price May Include Freedom, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2001, at 1
(remarking that Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act amid the heat of the

2004]

US CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS

haunting similarities to the government's present use of the
enemy combatant status.198 Enacted in the name of national
security, it allowed detention of U.S. citizens, permitted
detention without a person being charged, and allowed the
government to withhold information essential to a defense.1 9 9
Even the evidentiary standard was similar to the "some
evidence" standard, only requiring reasonable grounds to believe
the person was likely to conspire or engage in espionage or
sabotage. 200 Realizing how offensive the Emergency Detention
Act was to Americans 2 0 1 and the Constitution, Congress repealed
the act. 20 2 However, Congress concluded they needed to do more
Communist scare of the 1950s); Vladeck, supra note 26, at 961 (noting the Emergency
Detention Act was passed as a part of the Internal Security Act of 1950).
198 See Blumner, supra note 196 (explaining the Emergency Detention Act allowed
the president, through the attorney general, to hold without charge for the duration of a
war or emergency, any Americans who would probably engage in acts of espionage or
terrorism); see also Brandon & Schodolski, supra note 197 (explaining that the Emergency
Detention Act gave the Department of Justice and the president power to indefinitely
detain communists and suspected communist sympathizes and allocated money to build
detention camps); Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, A Year of Loss: Reexamining
Civil Liberties Since 9/11, Chptr. 4 (2002) (explaining that Title II of the Emergency
Detention Act authorized relocation of "alleged subversives" into detention centers during
wartime and detention without charge or trial at the behest of federal officials), available
at http://www.lchr.org/uslaw/lossfloss.ch4b.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Lawyers Committee].
199 See ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 13 (describing the nature of the Emergency
Detention Act); see also Brandon & Schodolski, supra note 197 (outlining government
powers under the Emergency Detention Act); Memorandum from Timothy H. Edgar,
2002)
at
(Sept. 13,
to
Interested Persons
Counsel,
Legislative
ACLU
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/1091302d.html [hereinafter Edgar Memo] (discussing the
scope of and reaction to the Emergency Detention Act).
200 Compare ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 23 (explaining the government's
contention that the petitioner can be confined indefinitely as long as the government
presents "some evidence" in support of its claims), with Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
86 (1992) (holding that in order to commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil
proceeding, the government is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual is mentally ill and requires hospitalization for his own welfare and for the
protection of others), and U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (explaining that the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires the government to offer clear and convincing evidence
why "no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or of any
person" from criminal suspects).
201 See ACLU Brief II, supra note 139, at 13 (quoting a letter from Deputy Attorney
General Kleindienst to Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee of 12/17/69
that "[Inn 1969 the Justice Department acknowledged that the continuation of the
Emergency Detention Act 'is extremely offensive to many Americans"'); Lumpkin, supra
note 196 (describing the Justice Department's hopes that repeal of the Emergency
Detention Act would allay the fears and suspicions it aroused in many Americans); see
also Edgar Memo, supra note 199 (noting that although the Emergency Detention Act was
never used, its existence provoked fear in many Americans).
202 See ACLU Brief II, supra note 139, at 13 (noting that Congress repealed the
Emergency Detention Act in 1971); Lumpkin, supra note 196 (explaining that in enacting
18 U.S.C. §4001, Congress also repealed the Emergency Detention Act); see also Edgar
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to protect Americans from arbitrary executive action in the
future and passed 18 U.S.C. § 4001 to limit the detention of

citizens to only those situations authorized by an act of
Congress. 203
The present detention of Hamdi and Padilla violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001.204 The statute states, "No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress." 205 The Supreme Court in Howe v. Smith
affirmed reading the statute broadly enough to prevent the
federal government from detaining a citizen even though he was
properly convicted in state court. 206 Though Robert Howe was
convicted of first-degree murder for raping and strangling an
elderly woman in Vermont, the Court held he could not be
transferred to federal prison for security reasons or any other
reason unless the federal government had authorization from
Congress. 207 In a footnote, Justice Burger rejected the
government's argument that the statute should not be applied to
Memo, supra note 199 (stating that Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act in
1971).
203 See ACLU Brief II, supra note 139, at 13 (explaining 18 U.S.C. § 4001 clearly
reflects Congress's intent to limit imprisonment or other detention of citizens to situations
in which statutory authorization exists); see also Blumner, supra note 196 (beginning by
stating that "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an act of Congress"); Vladeck, supra note 26, at 961 (explaining that
Congress's concern that mere repeal of the Emergency Detention Act would send an
ambiguous message about presidential power prompted it to add §4001 to 18 U.S.C.,
which limits imprisonment and other detention of citizens to situations authorized by
statute).
204 See ACLU Brief II, supra note 139, at 13 (explaining that neither 18 U.S.C. § 4001
nor the USA Patriot Act provide statutory authority for the detention of Jose Padilla); see
also ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 13 (asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 4001 is not limited to
the detention of citizens in civilian prisons and detention facilities, but rather in any
facility of the U.S. government). See generally Vladeck, supra note 26, at 968 (concluding
that detention of "enemy combatants" cannot be based upon a unilateral decision by the
executive branch).
205 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (2003) (delineating the limitation on detention and control of
prisons).
206 See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480 n.3 (1981) (stating that the plain language
of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) proscribes detention of any kind by the United States, absent a
congressional grant of authority to detain); ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 13-14 (stating
that contrary to the government's assertion, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) applies to detention or
imprisonment in any facility); see also Vladeck supra note 26, at 963 (explaining that the
standard set by the Supreme Court in Howe v. Smith indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
applies to any federal detention of a U.S. citizen).
207 See Howe, 452 U.S. at 476 (explaining how Vermont attempted to move prisoners
to federal prisons after closing a state facility); Ramirez, supra note 92, at 231 (describing
the Court's interpretation of Section 4001(a) "to mean that persons protected by the
Constitution shall not be detained indefinitely without congressional authority"); see also
Vladeck, supra note 26, at 963 (calling this aspect of the Court's case dicta).
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state prisoners by emphasizing "the need to give adequate weight
to the plain language of section 4001(a) proscribing detention of
any kind by the United States absent a congressional grant of
authority to detain."208 The court made clear that both the period
of time for which the individual was being detained and the
state's complicity is irrelevant. 2 09 In short the statute requires
congressional authority for the detention of any citizen by the
federal government. 2 10 Yet the Fourth Circuit ignored the plain
language of 18 U.S.C. § 4001 and construed the statute so as not
to apply to Hamdi.211 Judge Mukasey recognized the statute's
applicability to Padilla; but held Congressional authorization to
use force against those responsible for the attacks on September
justified Padilla's detention. 2 12 The Second Circuit
1 1 th
specifically "disagree[d] with the district court which held [the
joint resolution] must be read to confer authority for Padilla's
208 See Howe, 452 U.S. at 480 n.3 (emphasis added) (explaining that the plain
language of the statute proscribes federal detention of citizens without congressional
authority and that state complicity is irrelevant).
209 See id. (stating temporary detention, even at a state's request, offends the purpose
of 42 U.S.C. § 4001). See generally Ramirez, supra note 92, at 231-32 (analyzing §
4001(a)); Vladeck, supra note 26, at 963 (examining the Howe rationale).
210 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (stating that "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."); ACLU Brief I,
supra note 30, at 13-14 (noting that 18 U.S.C. §4001 plainly reflects Congress's intent to
limit detention and imprisonment of citizens to situations authorized by statute); see also
Lawyers Committee, supra note 198 (stating that the purpose of 18 U.S.C. §4001 was to
the restrict the imprisonment or detention of U.S. citizens to situations in which statutory
authority for their incarceration exists).
211 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the
statute was not "intended to overrule the longstanding rule that an armed and hostile
American citizen captured on the battlefield during wartime may be treated like [an]
enemy combatant"); Citizen Detained as 'Enemy Combatant'HasLimited Right to Consult
With Counsel, 72 CR1M. L. REPORTER 11, at 7 (Dec. 11, 2002) (explaining that the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the Joint Resolution qualifies as an "Act of Congress" and that its
broad language covers the petitioner's argument that his detention was barred by 18
U.S.C. § 4001), at http://litigationcenter.bna.com/pic2/lit.nsf/id/BNAP-5GQJPQ?OpenDocu
ment (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). See generally Susan Herman, Yaser Hamdi and the
Fourth Circuit's Legal No-Man's Land, JURIST (Jan. 13, 2003) (explaining the court's
conclusion that Congress's Use of Force resolution provided sufficient authorization for
the President to make any decisions regarding the conduct of the "war," including
detentions and therefore 18 U.S.C. § 4001 was not applicable to Hamdi), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/index.htm.
212 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing how
Congress's Use of Force resolution allows legal detention of Padilla as an unlawful
combatant); Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, Imbalance of Powers: How Changes
to U.S. Law & Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties 60 (Mar. 11,
2003) (explaining that court recognized the "Authorization for Use of Military Force"
resolution
provided
an
adequate
authorization
from
Congress'),
at
http://www.hri.ca/docCentre/docs/powers.pdf. But cf. 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (stating that "[n]o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress").
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detention. '213 The Fourth Circuit used a rationale similar to that
of Judge Mukasey's as an alternative argument. However, the
right to use force cannot be said to be authorization to detain
citizens. 214
IX. DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The government violated both Padilla's and Hamdi's Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law by detaining them with
no meaningful judicial review. 215 "The Fifth Amendment
guarantees, '[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."' 216 Hamdi's and Padilla's

procedural due process rights were violated by the denial of an
opportunity to be heard.217 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit
violated Hamdi's procedural due process by denying him the
opportunity to respond to the allegations in the Mobbs
Declaration; 2 18 thereby, stripping him of his liberty without the
213 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616, at *77-78 (2d Cir. Dec. 18,
2003).
214 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (stating that "freedom from
imprisonment - from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint
- lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects"); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V, §1 (providing that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (affirming that "[tihe very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection").
215 See Kacprowski, supra note 92, at 696 (concluding that the courts used the Enemy
Combatant Laws to avoid the accused's Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal procedure
protections). See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162 (1951) (noting that "the requirement of 'due process' is not a fair-weather or timid
assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble"); Sam Stanton
& Emily Bazar, Security Collides With Civil Rights War On Terrorism Has Unforeseen
Results, MODESTO BEE, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al (noting Padilla's and Hamdi's conditions of
detainment).
216 ACLU Brief I, supra note 30, at 4 (citing U.S. CONST .amend. V, § 1).
217 See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), which held that "[tlhe fundamental requirement of due process
is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"');
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (stating that the "right to be heard before being condemned to
suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships
of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society"); see also Stanton and Bazar,
supra note 215 (chastising the Bush administration for creating "a new category that
allows U.S. citizens to be classified as "enemy combatants" who can be held without
charges and denied access to lawyers").
218 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (discussing how Fourth Circuit denied Hamdi access
to counsel by reversing a district court order giving him the right to meet with his lawyer
Frank Dunham); Tom Jackman, Judge Skewers U.S. Curbs on Detainee, WASH. POST,
Aug. 14, 2002, at A10 (quoting U.S. District Judge Robert G Doumar, "I do think that due
process requires something other than a basic assertion by someone named Mobbs that
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opportunity to put forth any evidence to the contrary violates his
2 19
due process rights.
Moreover, Judge Mukasey's efforts to afford Padilla procedural
due process were repeatedly frustrated by the government's
refusal to comply with his orders. 220 He has explained that
finding Padilla was an enemy combatant with no opportunity to
rebut the assertions in Mobbs declaration would be an arbitrary
exercise of government power. 2 2 1 Depriving an individual of the
right to be heard not only violates procedural due process but
also arbitrarily takes away liberty constituting a violation of
substantive due process. 22 2 Judge Mukasey recognizes declaring
Padilla an enemy combatant before he has met with counsel
would violate these Constitutional guarantees and this has

they have looked at some papers and therefore they have determined he should be held
incommunicado"). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI, §1. (providing that "the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense").
219 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (explaining that a detainee is
"entitled to constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for his
confinement"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (providing that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). See generally Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690 (explaining that when the Executive branch attempts to seize citizens, it
is this power which strikes at "the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause
protects").
220 On December 4, 2002, Judge Mukasey ordered defense counsel be allowed to meet
with Padilla and scheduled a conference for December 30, 2002 to discuss the
arrangements. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
government first delayed and then filed an untimely motion to reconsider on January 9,
2003. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (S.D.N.Y 2003). The court
reconsidered the motion and again ordered that defense counsel be allowed to meet with
Padilla and scheduled a meeting for March 27, 2003. See Id. The government refused to
comply with the order and requested certification for interlocutory appeal, which judge
Mukasey granted. See id.
221 Judge Mukasey wrote that he could not "confirm that Padilla has not been
arbitrarily detained without giving him an opportunity to respond to the government's
allegations." Padilla,243 F. Supp. at 54. Even the Fourth Circuit was reluctant to take
the government's position that "with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or
counsel on the government's say-so."' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir.
2002); Nat Hentoff, A Citizen Shorn Of All Rights, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Jan. 7, 2003, at
23.
222 See Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (explaining arbitrary deprivation of liberty
violates the due process clause); Doug Cassel, A Final Toll; Were Rights Also Casualties of
Sept. 11?, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 23, 2002, at 1C (noting that "[w]hile there is a strong public
interest in detaining a suspected terrorist, the only procedural safeguard for his current
confinement as an 'enemy combatant' is the say-so of executive branch officials"). See
generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(explaining "there can be no doubt that the [Due Process Clause] at a minimum ...
require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case").
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prevented him from making any final determination on Jose
Padilla's status as an enemy combatant. 223
CONCLUSION

Detaining American citizens as enemy combatants exemplifies
our government's overreaction to legitimate security threats in
time of war. We have crossed the line and invaded the rights of
these individuals by stripping them of their liberty without due
process of law. They have been denied their right to counsel,
denied their right to be heard, denied the statutory protection of
18 U.S.C. § 4001, and detained based on an imprudent,
unjustified expansion of Ex Parte Quirin. The courts have shown
the government undue deference, they have emphasized the need
for security, and rationalize the denial of fundamental rights
with the laws of war. In my view our liberties have been
ratcheted down below what our constitutional minimum is and
can not be justified by any cost benefit analysis.
However, our jurisprudential evolution has been brought to
bear on the dynamic pull between security and civil liberty.
Judge Mukasey felt the need to temper extreme views in this
volatile controversy by mentioning the limits of the case in his
opinion of March 12, 2003. The government boldly cautioned him
against sacrificing security and risking future attacks by going
too far to protect individual rights. 22 4 With equal severity amicus
curiae submissions spoke of reverting to Korematsu, repudiating
the Magna Carta, and suggesting dictatorship is around the
corner. 2 2 5
223 See Padilla v. Bush, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 53 ("At a minimum, if the government
had permitted Padilla to consult with counsel at the outset, this matter would have been
long since decided in this court..") (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Kacprowski, supra note 92, at 694
(noting that "the Padilla court carefully crafted its holding to provide alleged enemy
combatants with the protection of right to counsel and also to provide courts with
flexibility in applying that right"). See generally Weiser, supra note 177 (reporting Judge
Mukasey's impatience and irritation with the government).
224 See Padilla v. Bush, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 57; see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that "several federal
courts.., have wisely respected the executive's judgment in prosecuting the national
response to terrorism" and it "is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive
judgments made... exercis[ing] the expertise of protecting national security"). See
generally Karen Branch-Brioso, Fight Over Rights Rages On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 8, 2002, at B1 (reporting that the Justice Department says that "some erosion of
individual liberty is acceptable in the name of national security").
225 See Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (equating these assertions with the opposite
assertion that denying Padilla consultation with counsel will increase the chances that
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Those to whom images of catastrophe come that easily might
take comfort in recalling that it is a year and a half since
September 11, 2001, and Padilla's is not only the first, but
also the only case of its kind. There is every reason not only
to hope, but also to expect that this case will be just another
of the isolated cases, like Quirin, that deal with isolated
events and have limited application. 2 26
For the individuals involved this may seem like a small
comfort but there is truth to the statements. Judge Mukasey has
been insistent in demanding Padilla be afforded his due process.
Presently there are two Americans unjustly held but there has
not been the detention of an entire race. In Korematsu liberty
was removed without even the requirement of suspicion and the
Court upheld the detention. Here, the US attorneys have had to
ignore court orders to deny Padilla access to counsel.
This does not diminish the gravity of the constitutional
implications of detaining citizens as enemy combatants. The
need to speak out against the infringement of civil liberties is in
no way diminished by the strides civil libertarians have made. In
fact challenging infringements of our civil liberties is a necessary
component of our jurisprudential evolution. Safeguards such as
18 U.S.C. § 4001 will only be put in place if government attempts
to restrict our liberty are met with resistance. History supports
the view that this resistance will continue and we will recognize
our indiscretions and erect safeguards for the future once the
immediate crisis has passed.
The view that terrorism is a threat of such a magnitude never
before encountered by our country, so that historical comparisons
of constitutional challenges are inappropriate, is flawed. A global
power, an "Evil Empire", with a nuclear arsenal and a manifesto
calling for world dominance was attempting to overthrow
governments around the world and had planted sympathizers in
America dedicated to the overthrow of our government. People
built fallout shelters in schools, learned to "duck and cover", and
future attacks "will go undetected"). See generally M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Don't Tread On
Me; Is The War On Terror Really A War On Rights?, CI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2003, at 1C
(illustrating the exaggerated import of Padilla's fate noted by Judge Mukasey);
Mihalopoulos, supra note 178 (quoting Judge Mukasey's sarcastic comment that if Padilla
does not get all the legal protections he is entitled to then "the tanks will have rolled").
226 Padilla,243 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (noting the court's view this holding is of extremely
narrow application).
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watched as nuclear missiles headed to Cuba just off our shores.
Those who argue the threat posed by terrorism is larger than any
faced before suffer from temporal arrogance or ignorance of the
past. The United States has been threatened with apocalypse
and after overreacting to that threat we restored constitutional
rights and built additional protections into our law. These
protections operate to limit government restriction of our civil
liberties today and will be improved upon after the immediate
crisis is over.
This is the jurisprudential evolution our
forefathers contemplated in operation.
REASSURANCE FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The Second Circuit's recent opinion regarding Padilla restored
my confidence in our judiciary and the rule of law in America.
The court held that judicial deference is limited, that the NonDetention Act prohibits detention of an American citizen as an
enemy combatant absent congressional authority. 227 The order to
release of Jose Padilla 22 8 will be stayed until the Supreme Court
hears it. Nonetheless the opinion affirmed my belief that our
jurisprudence has evolved for the better and with each crisis the
protection of our civil liberties grows stronger.

227 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003 US App. LEXIS 25616 at *83-84 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2003).
228 Id. at 84.

